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Social engineering costs organizations billions of dollars a year. Social engineering
exploits the weakest link of information security systems, the people who are using them.
Phishing is a form of social engineering in which the perpetrator depends on the victim’s
instinctual thinking towards an email designed to create a fear or excitement response. It
is well-documented in literature that users continue to click on phishing emails costing
them and their employers significant monetary resources and data loss. Training does not
appear to mitigate the effects of phishing much; other solutions are necessary to mitigate
phishing.
Kahneman introduced the concepts of System One and System Two thinking. System
One is a quick, instinctual decision-making process. Examples of System One processes
are orienting to a sudden sound or an experienced driver pressing the brake when faced
with road danger. In contrast, Kahneman identified the process by which humans use a
slow, logical process as System Two. System Two requires attention, is much slower, and
is easily disrupted. Examples of System Two are looking for a person with a certain
characteristic or checking the validity of a complex logical argument. The key aim of this
study was to investigate if requiring the user to pause by presenting a countdown or
count-up timer when a possible phishing email is opened will influence the user to enter
System Two thinking.
This study designed, developed, and empirically tested a Pause and Think (PAT) mobile
app that presented a user with a warning dialog and either a countdown or count-up timer
whenever an email with a link was opened. The user was not able to interact with the
email until the timer expired. The main goal of this research study was to determine
whether requiring e-mail users to pause and wait for a colored warning with a timer when
they are presented with a potentially malicious link has any effect on the percentage of
falling to phishing attempts. The experimental field study was completed in three phases
in which 42 subject matter experts and 107 participants took part. The results indicated
that a countdown timer set at three seconds accompanied by red warning text was most
effective (p<0.001) on the user’s ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link or
attachment. Recommendations for future research include enhancements to the PAT
mobile app and investigating what effect the time of day has on susceptibility to phishing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
Social engineering is a technique in which the attacker attempts to build a relationship
with the victim to convince the victim to give the attacker information or to perform other
actions that lead to malicious impact or financial losses (Krombholz et al., 2015).
Krombholz et al. (2015) categorized social engineering attacks into subgroups: physical,
technical, and social. A physical attack is one in which the attacker uses some physical
means to attack such as dumpster diving, impersonation, or having a door to a secure
room held open for them. A technical attack is one in which the attacker uses purely
digital means to gather information such as through software or a search engine. A social
attack is one in which the attacker pretends to have some authority to convince the victim
to release information. Some attacks combine two or more categories. For instance,
Business Email Compromise (BEC) combines the social and technical attack categories
(Zweighaft, 2017). BEC is an attack in which an e-mail that appears to be from a
company employee in authority such as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is sent to a
lower-level employee in a finance department requesting a financial withdrawal or
transfer (Mansfield-Devine, 2018; Zweighaft, 2017). When the financial transaction is
completed, the funds transfer to the attacker. Phishing is another example of an attack
that combines the social and technical attack categories and was the focus of this study
(Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019). Phishing is an e-mail- or instant-messaging-based attack
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aimed at a large group in which the attacker attempts to convince the intended victim to
take some action such as click on a link. Attackers use phishing to create a fear response
in their victims (Goel et al., 2017) which leads victims to use heuristics which may lead
to systematic errors (Kahneman, 2011).
Kahneman (2011) referred to the process by which humans use heuristics to make a
quick decision as System One. System One is a quick, instinctual decision-making
process. Examples of System One processes are orienting to a sudden sound or an
experienced driver pressing the brake when faced with road danger. In contrast,
Kahneman (2011) identified the process by which humans use a slow, logical process as
System Two. System Two requires attention, is much slower, and is easily disrupted.
Examples of System Two are looking for a person with a certain characteristic or
checking the validity of a complex logical argument. Hall et al. (2018) discussed System
One and System Two with respect to encouraging medical students to engage System
Two when making a diagnosis. They stated that medical students using System One tend
to make more errors. In addition, Itri and Patel (2018) found that while heuristics can be
useful in the field of medical imaging, heuristics can lead to cognitive bias. Cognitive
bias is described as “a systematic error in reasoning or judgement” (p. 1097), which can
lead to serious errors.
Text color can also affect user judgement (Kahneman, 2011). Acquisti et al. (2017)
discussed text color in website design decisions, stating that required messaging that the
designer would rather the user not notice, such as an unsubscribe link, is made in bland
colors, while messaging that the designer would like the user to focus on, such as
choosing to make a profile public, is shown in bright colors. This is a form of digital
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nudging, which is defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing
their economic incentives” (Acquisti et al., 2017, p. 44:11). Anderson et al. (2015) stated
that text color in a warning message should stand out to the user so that the user’s
attention is captured.
This experimental field study used the Pause And Think (PAT) mobile app that was
designed and simulated a Gmail account inbox. When an e-mail was opened, a timer
dialog blocked access to the e-mail until the timer expired. The need for this work is
demonstrated by the works of Anderson et al. (2016), who used functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to demonstrate that users quickly habituate to static warnings,
and by Amran et al. (2018) who stated that users will often consider security warnings
irrelevant or even try to evade them. This dissertation built on previous research by Ball
et al. (2015) and by Kahneman (2011). Ball et al. (2015) suggested that additional studies
are required to understand what factors lead to habit as well as the relationship between
habit and practice. They found that awareness of risks was not a significant influence
over practice, and rather that habit was a stronger influence. It may be that requiring the
user to pause will create a habit for pausing before opening an email even when the user
is not required to do so.
Problem Statement
The global research problem that this study addressed was that social engineering
costs organizations billions of dollars a year (FBI, 2018; Musuva et al., 2019; Salahdine
& Kaabouch, 2019; Thomas, 2018). Since social engineering is such a significant
financial problem, investigating ways to mitigate it is of interest. This study focused on
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the problem of why users make judgement errors when evaluating the risks involved in
clicking on an unknown link in an e-mail.
Even when warned, users choose to put aside security concerns when deciding
whether to follow links presented in an e-mail (Vance et al., 2018). A possible
explanation for this is that users do not properly evaluate the risk involved in clicking on
an unknown link, especially when overworked (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011). Hirshleifer et
al. (2019) found that financial analysts produce better forecasts when they are not
mentally fatigued and use heuristics as they get more fatigued. Users also move to a
heuristic process as they become more fatigued (Arazy et al., 2017), and it appears that
this is also the case when they are deciding whether a displayed link is safe to follow.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) stated that heuristics are assumptions made to simplify
decisions and that users can be taught to recognize when they are using heuristics to
make a decision. By requiring the user to pause in this study, the user’s thought stream
may have been interrupted, and the user may have been switched to System Two
thinking. Risbey and Lewandowsky (2017) defined a pause as a hiatus. Jensen et al.
(2017) suggested that requiring the user to pause will encourage the user to reflect on the
content of an e-mail message.
As with the medical students investigated by Hall et al. (2018), users are likely to
engage in System Two thinking the first time they see a warning (Anderson et al., 2016),
which is a message displayed to the user encouraging the user to consider the safety of
taking an action such as clicking on a link (Amran et al., 2018), but tasks that are
repeated appear to be processed using System One. This pattern of action often results in
an error in judgement regarding the safety of a displayed link (Anderson et al., 2016).
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Repetitive tasks are recognized by the brain and the effort extended to accomplish these
tasks is diminished. Because of the diminished effort put forth by the brain, static, or
passive, warnings lose effectiveness over time (Anderson et al., 2016) and System One
takes over (Kahneman, 2011).
In addition to the fact that repetitive messaging appears to disengage users, the color
of a message also appears to help or hinder user attention (Kahneman, 2011). Wogalter et
al. (2002) stated that red has been found to increase the hazard rating of a warning, and
that colored labels, especially red, are more noticeable than grey. Anderson et al. (2015)
found no difference in user attention when a warning was presented in red rather than
grayscale. They acknowledged that their finding was contrary to prior research and
encouraged further research on the topic of warning text color. Using text color to
digitally nudge the user may increase the likelihood of capturing the user’s attention.
In summary, this research addressed the problem that users use heuristics to judge
whether to click on a link in an e-mail, and that heuristics may lead to misjudgment.
Thus, it appeared that, by requiring the user to pause, the user may have been led out of a
heuristic thought process into a logical thought process. In addition, text color may have
also moved the user into a more logical thought process.
Dissertation Goal
The main goal of this research study was to determine through experimental field
study whether requiring e-mail users to pause by displaying a colored warning (grey, red,
or black text) with a timer (countdown, count-up, or no counter) when they are presented
with a potentially malicious link has any effect on the percentage of users falling to
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phishing attempts. Previous work by Musuva et al. (2019) used an experimental field
study to investigate user behavior when faced with a potential phish.
The five specific goals of this research study were as follows. This study included
three separate lengths of time (timer values) for which the users were required to pause.
Each length of time was used separately to determine the pause duration that produced
the highest statistically significant result of identifying malicious links in e-mail.
Therefore, the first specific goal was to identify and validate, using cybersecurity Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs), the three lengths of time to require the users to pause that should
be used to assess their ability to identify malicious links in e-mail. A custom-designed
mobile app, PAT, was designed and developed. PAT needed to be tested for functional
correctness and validity. Therefore, the second specific goal was to assess the functional
correctness and validity of PAT, along with validating the sample e-mails that included
simulated potentially malicious links, using cybersecurity SMEs.
There are contradictory studies regarding the most effective text color for a warning
message (Anderson et al., 2015). Since Anderson et al. (2015) reported that prior research
stated that color should stimulate brain activity, yet found no difference in brain activity
using red text, this study used grey, red, and black (Control) text. Therefore, the third
specific goal was to determine whether there are statistically significant mean differences
between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not
required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer values
displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black text.
Countdown timers have been found to be effective in different research fields,
including medicine (Marto et al., 2016) and in pedestrian crosswalks (Keegan &
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O’Mahony, 2003). Count-up timers have been used to measure vigilance (Lo et al.,
2019). It may be that a countdown or count-up timer will move a user from a heuristic,
System One thought process to a logical, System Two thought process. Moreover, to
ensure the validity of the experiments, no timer was given to the control group.
Therefore, the fourth specific goal was to determine whether there are statistically
significant mean differences between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of
e-mail users who are not required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at
three separate timer values displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or
(c) no timer (control).
Age, gender, and education level have all been found to be statistically significant
with regard to user cybersecurity behavior (Ball et al., 2015; Carlton, 2016). Attention
span (Conteh & Royer, 2016) and the volume of information presented to the user
(Marriott, 2018) has also been found to be statistically significant with regard to
cybersecurity behavior. Therefore, the fifth specific goal was to determine whether there
are statistically significant mean differences between the ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to pause vs. email users who are
required to pause at three separate timer values based on the categories of: (a) age, (b)
gender, (c) education level, (d) attention span, and (e) the volume of email that the user
receives in a day.
Research Questions
The main research question that this study addressed was: Are there statistically
significant mean differences between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of
e-mail users who are not required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at
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three separate timer values presented with a countdown or count-up timer with a red or
grey warning message?
The five specific research questions that this study addressed were:
RQ1: What are the three timer values to require the user to pause that should be
used in this experimental field study to assess users’ ability to identify
malicious links in e-mail according to cybersecurity SMEs?
RQ2: What level of functional correctness and validity of the custom-designed
mobile app is sufficient according to cybersecurity SMEs?
RQ3: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black warning
text?
RQ4: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer?
RQ5a: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black warning
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text based on the categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level, (d)
attention span, and (e) the volume of email that the user receives in a day?
RQ5b: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer based on the categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level,
(d) attention span, and (e) the volume of email that the user receives in a
day?
Relevance and Significance
This study is relevant and significant because it advances understanding of e-mail
user behavior on a mobile device when that e-mail user is faced with a potentially
malicious link. Understanding e-mail user behavior in this scenario is significant because
billions of dollars a year are lost to phishing attacks (FBI, 2018; Musuva et al., 2019;
Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019; Thomas, 2018). In addition, corporate reputations are
harmed, corporate secrets are stolen, and classified information is exposed (Jensen et al.,
2017).
While there have been attempts to counter phishing, none have been entirely
successful. Training programs for e-mail users that are designed to mitigate phishing
attacks have been found to be largely unsuccessful (Burns et al., 2019; Goel et al., 2017;
Gordon, Wright, Glynn, et al., 2019). Static warning messages have been found to be
ineffective in the long run, and in some cases, even have an adverse effect on e-mail user
reaction to phishing attempts (Junger et al., 2017). Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón

10

(2007) studied the effect of polymorphic warnings on the acceptance of unjustified risk
by e-mail users when presented with a potentially malicious link. Unjustified e-mail risk
is defined as an e-mail which the user is not expecting or in which the user does not know
the sender. Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón (2007) found that, while polymorphic
warnings resulted in a lower click rate of unjustified risks than static warning messages,
the frequency of unjustified risks was still 80%.
This study offered promise to address this problem because the polymorphic
techniques proposed are designed to engage the slow, logical thought process of the email user on a mobile device, referenced by Kahneman (2011) as System Two. Engaging
the e-mail user in System Two was promising because errors in judgement have been
found to occur when people use heuristics, referenced by Kahneman (2011) as System
One (Gerlach et al., 2019; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Using a countdown or count-up
timer as part of the warning message was promising because it has been shown that
people often assess timed events as important (Acquisti et al., 2017; Cheong, 2018;
Keegan & O’Mahony, 2003; Marto et al., 2016; Newquist et al., 2012).
Barriers and Issues
Since live emails were not used, it is possible that the e-mails would not be valid. To
mitigate this possibility, simulated phishing e-mails that have been validated by an
outside expert source were used. The outside expert source was also validated.
Finn and Jakobsson (2007) categorize phishing studies into three groups: survey,
closed-lab experiments, and simulation. This study fell under the category of a closed-lab
experiment which allowed evaluation of participant reaction to phishing but had the
drawback of participant knowledge of the experiment. Participant knowledge of the
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experiment may have made participants hypervigilant towards detecting a phish and,
therefore, may have skewed the results. This study attempted to mitigate skewing of the
results by not informing participants that the focus of the study was phishing. It was
planned that participants be informed that the focus of study was email usage.
Since this study used colored warning text, color-blindness in the participants could
have been a barrier. A question was added to the survey that participants took when they
opened PAT for the first time. The question asked if they are color-blind, and, if so,
whether they are red-green color-blind, blue-yellow color-blind, or completely colorblind (National Eye Institute, 2019). If a participant indicated that they are totally color
blind, their results were excluded from the study.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
It was assumed that participants and SMEs were truthful when answering the surveys
within the study. It was assumed that enough participants and SMEs would be found to
achieve an acceptable sample size conducive to the statistical analysis that was
performed. It was assumed that the consent form, directions, and sample e-mails were
understandable by the participants. It was assumed that all participants had access to an
Apple or Android mobile device capable of running PAT.
Limitations
A limitation of this study was that recruitment was managed in limited use of social
media platforms which made it difficult to recruit a sufficient number of participants.
Invitations were posted on Facebook and LinkedIn with a note to encourage sharing.
Another limitation was that participants self-reported their color-blindness. Two other
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limitations were that participants were chosen by convenience sampling and that the
population used in this study was limited to English-speaking adults who use either an
Android or Apple mobile phone.
Delimitations
A delimitation of this study was that only Gmail was simulated. Another delimitation
was that all participants and SMEs were fluent in English. A delimitation of this study
was that participants owned an Android or Apple mobile device capable of running PAT.
Summary
Social engineering, which includes phishing, is still an open problem that costs
organizations billions of dollars a year (FBI, 2018; Musuva et al., 2019; Salahdine &
Kaabouch, 2019; Thomas, 2018). In addition, phishing continues to present a significant
threat to users in both their personal and professional lives leading to personal or
corporate data loss (Carlton et al., 2018). Kahneman (2011) identified two processes. The
first process, in which humans use a quick, instinctual thought process, he called System
One. The second process, in which humans use a slow, logical thought process, he called
System Two. Kahneman (2011) also stated that text color may affect judgement.
The research problem that this study addressed is that social engineering costs
organizations billions of dollars a year (FBI, 2018; Musuva et al., 2019; Salahdine &
Kaabouch, 2019; Thomas, 2018). This study focused on the addressable problem of why
users make judgement errors when evaluating the risks involved in clicking on an
unknown link in an e-mail. In this study, it may have been that moving the user to the
slower, logical System Two thought process mitigated the user’s susceptibility to a
phishing attack.
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This research proposed to mitigate phishing by moving the user from a System One,
fast, heuristic mindset to a System Two, slow, logical mindset by presenting a countdown
or count-up timer with colored warning text. This study used PAT, a custom mobile app,
to simulate a Gmail client. Participants interacted with the app as they would when
checking e-mail. The app embedded a survey that opened when the participant opened
the app for the first time.
The main research question that this study addressed is: Are there statistically
significant mean differences between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of
e-mail users who are not required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at
three separate timer values presented with a countdown or count-up timer with a red or
grey warning message? The first specific research question addressed what the timer
value should be that will be used in the countdown and count-up timers. The second
specific research question addressed the validity and functionality of PAT. The third
through fifth research questions addressed what effect the type of timer (countdown or
count-up), the timer value, the color of warning text (grey, red, or black [control]), and
demographic factors (age, gender, education level, attention span, and the volume of
email that the user receives in a day) has on a user’s ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link.
This study was relevant and significant because it advanced understanding of e-mail
user behavior on a mobile device when that e-mail user is faced with a potentially
malicious link. No attempts to counter phishing have been entirely successful. User
training has had mixed success and static warnings have been found to be ineffective.
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Polymorphic warnings show promise; the reason may be that polymorphic warnings
move the user into a logical, System Two thought process.
Potential issues were that live e-mail was not used, so that participants may have been
hypervigilant when checking the simulated e-mail, and that participants may have been
color-blind. To mitigate the potential barrier of simulated e-mails rather than live e-mails,
the simulated emails were adopted from an outside repository of simulated phishing
emails. Participant hypervigilance was designed to be mitigated by informing participants
that the focus of this study is e-mail usage. The demographic survey that appeared the
first time PAT was opened included a question on color-blindness, and the answers to
that question were addressed when the data were analyzed.
It was assumed that participants had access to an Apple or Android mobile device
capable of running PAT. A limitation of this study was that unseen errors in data
collection may have affected the results. Every effort was taken to ensure that the data
were valid. A delimitation of this study was that all SMEs and participants were fluent in
English.
Definition of Terms
Attention span – “The amount of concentrated time we can spend on any single task
without getting distracted by other tasks” (Bulling, 2016, p. 94).
Business Email Compromise – An attack in which an e-mail that appears to be from a
company employee in authority is sent to a lower-level employee in a finance department
requesting a financial withdrawal or transfer (Mansfield-Devine, 2018; Zweighaft, 2017).
Cognitive bias – “A systematic error in reasoning or judgement” (Itri & Patel, 2018, p.
1097)
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Cybersecurity – “The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and
if needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to
ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (Carlton, 2016, p. 14).
Digital Nudging – “Any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in
a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their
economic incentives” (Acquisti et al., 2017, p. 44:11).
Heuristic – An assumption made to simplify a decision (Kahneman, 2011).
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) - Any information that can be used to
identify the owner of that information (Carlton, 2016).
Phish – An email or instant-message sent to a potential victim in a phishing attack
(Chaudhry et al., 2016).
Phishing – An e-mail- or instant-messaging-based attack aimed at a large group in which
the attacker attempts to convince the intended victim to take some action such as click on
a link (Chaudhry et al., 2016).
Polymorphic Warning – a warning that changes appearance with the aim of reducing
user habituation (Anderson et al., 2016).
Social Attack – An attack in which the attacker pretends to have some authority to
convince the victim to release information (Krombholz et al., 2015).
System One – A quick, instinctual decision-making thought process (Kahneman, 2011).
System Two – A slow, logical thought process (Kahneman, 2011).
Social Engineering – The technique in which the attacker attempts to build a relationship
with the victim to convince the victim to give the attacker information or to perform other
actions that lead to malicious impact or financial losses (Krombholz et al., 2015).
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Unjustified E-Mail Risk – An e-mail which the user is not expecting or in which the
user does not know the sender (Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007).
Warning – A message displayed to the user encouraging the user to consider the safety
of taking an action such as clicking on a link (Amran et al., 2018).
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Topics related to this research are discussed in this review of literature. Specifically,
social engineering is examined with a focus on phishing. Next, heuristics, with a focus on
Kahneman’s System One and System Two, decision-making, and habituation are
reviewed. Literature related to mobile devices is reviewed next. Phishing mitigation
techniques are next, including a review of polymorphic dialogs and training. Lastly,
timers, especially in healthcare, civil engineering, psychology, and text color are
discussed.
Social Engineering
Social engineering is one of the most under-researched and most effective
cybercrimes (Jain et al., 2016). Social engineering is defined as “the art of exploiting the
weakest link of information security systems: the people who are using them” (Jain et al.,
2016, p. 94). Mihelič et al. (2019) called the human factor in social engineering a lever
that is exploited by attackers. There are four stages of social engineering: (1) information
gathering, (2) gain trust, or hook relationship, (3) exploit trust and execute attack, and (4)
exit (Mitnick & Simon, 2003; Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019). In the information
gathering stage, the attacker performs a reconnaissance, which is an information gather
about their target. In the hook relationship phase, the attacker baits the victim with fear or
excitement (Goel et al., 2017). In the play exploitation and execution phase, the attacker
executes the attack, and in the out phase, the attacker leaves with no or limited trace that
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they were ever there. Krombholz et al. (2015) suggested four types of social engineering:
physical, technical, social, and socio-technical. A physical attack is one in which the
attacker does a physical action such as dumpster dive, in which an attacker will use to
gather information about a potential future victim. A technical attack is one in which the
attacker uses purely technical means to gather information, such as harvesting
information online about future victims. A social attack is one in which the attacker uses
supposed authority to convince the victim to do something (e.g., vishing or voicephishing). An example of vishing is calling in to technical support and pretending to
forget a password so that the victim will reset it. Most social attacks are done by phone
(Krombholz et al., 2015). A socio-technical attack combines both social and technical
attacks, using elements of both types to perform an attack. Phishing falls into this
category. This study had a technical aspect, namely the countdown or count-up timer, and
a social aspect, namely an attempt to move the user into a thought-provoking mindset.
Technical solutions to combat social engineering typically do not work (Krombholz
et al., 2015), and Jain et al. (2016) said that there are no technical solutions to the
problem of social engineering. Users are often too confident in their ability to detect a
social engineering attack (Krombholz et al., 2015), partially because social engineers are
becoming more devious. This means that suggestions for countering social engineering
just two years ago are no longer useful. For example, in 2018, Abass advised to look for
the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol in a Universal Resource
Locator (URL), but in 2020, the Anti-Phishing Working Group advised not to rely on
presence of the HTTPS protocol since up to 75% of attackers now use websites using that
protocol (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2020). These data provided relevance to this
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study because it shows that the field of social engineering mitigation is under constant
change.
A number of studies have simulated social engineering in different settings, including
a corporation (Bullée et al., 2015; Workman, 2008), five hospitals (Medlin et al., 2008), a
military base (Biros et al., 2002; George et al., 2004), and a university (Mensch &
Wilkie, 2011). Overall, the results from these studies showed that social engineering is
still a significant issue. Just-in-time training (Biros et al., 2002; Workman, 2008) and
creating an awareness of the dangers of social engineering (Bullée et al., 2015) can
promote detection of social engineering. Bullée et al. (2015) created three interventions to
warn against social engineering: a leaflet, a blue keychain that said, “Don’t give me to a
stranger,” and a poster with a funny quote. A week after giving the interventions to three
treatment groups, they deployed social engineering “attackers” with the goal of getting
the keys from the participants. They reported that staff who were not given the
intervention surrendered their keys at 2.84 times more often than those who were given
one of the three interventions. Biros et al. (2002) asked Air Force personnel to complete
tasks using a known database. The personnel were told that a disgruntled and discharged
database manager manipulated data before he left. Treatments given were just-in-time
training and training six weeks before the task. They found that personnel that received
the just-in-time training were better able to detect false data than the personnel that
received formal training six weeks prior. They also found, though, that the personnel that
received just-in-time training were more likely to mark data that are valid as invalid.
Biros et al. (2002) recommended just-in-time training warnings. George et al. (2004) also
investigated the effect of deception training on Air Force personnel and found that
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training improved understanding of deception but did not improve detection ability. They
created three types of training, some of which included computer-based training. They
found no difference in the interventions, and stated that, since computer-based training
appeared to be just as effective as human-based training, human-based resources could be
saved by using computer-based resources instead. Workman (2008) also created three
types of trainings to investigate the effects of training on employees of a Fortune 500
company. The three trainings were punishment-based, ethics-based, and on social
engineering. Six months after the training was given, they simulated a phishing
campaign. They found that those with a greater fear response responded best to the
punishment-based training, and that those with a higher level of commitment and trust
responded best to the social engineering training. They reported that the ethics training
had no effect.
Many studies found that users are susceptible to social engineering (Fleming, 2017;
Medlin et al., 2008; Mensch & Wilkie, 2011; Wang et al., 2021). Medlin et al. (2008)
simulated a social engineering attack by issuing a survey to employees of five different
hospitals asking for user passwords. While the administrations of those hospitals gave
permission for the surveys to be distributed, they did not endorse the survey to the
employees which would have affected the validity of the study. Medlin et al. (2008)
found that 73% of employees surveyed gave their personal passwords on the survey.
Medlin et al. (2008) stated that the implication of their research was that systems could be
easily cracked if employees are willing to release their passwords, which, in the hospital
environment, could easily lead to a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). They stated that it is imperative that employees receive
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good and effective training against social engineering attacks. Fleming (2017) also stated
that training is an important intervention to mitigate the effects of social engineering. He
investigated unauthorized disclosures of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and
Non-public Personal Information (NPI) in the public-school system. Using an interview
methodology, Fleming (2017) found that users often forgot that data needed to be
protected, making them suspectable to a social engineering attack. As with Fleming
(2017), Mensch and Wilkie (2011) also found that attitudes regarding social engineering
were low. They studied the security behaviors of undergraduate and graduate university
students and used the students’ majors as a demographic variable. Mensch and Wilkie
(2011) found that Information Technology (IT) and fine arts majors had the highest
security attitude, and healthcare and criminology majors had the lowest security attitude.
They expressed surprise that the criminology majors scored low given that these students
were headed for careers in law enforcement and similar fields, and they expressed
concern that healthcare majors scored low since the low score indicated a possible future
violation of HIPAA.
Wang et al. (2021) created a framework to describe user vulnerabilities to social
engineering and then tested the framework with 16 social engineering attack cases. They
found more than thirty effect mechanism and more than forty human vulnerabilities to
social engineering. These studies gave relevance to this study because they showed that
social engineering is still a significant problem to be addressed.
Facebook seemed to be a popular platform for social engineering studies (Albladi &
Weir, 2020; Algarni et al., 2017; Cheung et al., 2015; Dincelli & Chengalur-Smith, 2020;
Ross et al., 2018; Terlizzi et al., 2017). All the studies that investigated Facebook as a
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platform reported some risk of social engineering. In particular, the influence on different
characteristics of Facebook components on social engineering have been investigated,
including characteristics of a user (Albladi & Weir, 2020), characteristics of a profile
being viewed (Algarni et al., 2017), what characteristics lead users to self-disclose on
Facebook (Cheung et al., 2015; Dincelli & Chengalur-Smith, 2020), the influence of
warnings on the user belief of fake news (Ross et al., 2018), and the influence of
characteristics of a fake Facebook profile on having a user accept a friend request and on
subsequently giving information to that profile (Terlizzi et al., 2017). Cheung et al.
(2015) studied the effects of perceived cost, perceived benefit, and social influence on
why Facebook users self-disclose personal information. They investigated these effects
by collecting data through an online survey from participants at a large university in
Hong Kong. Their results indicated that perceived benefit and social influence had the
greatest effect on self-disclosure behavior on Facebook. They expressed surprise that
perceived cost had no apparent effect on self-disclosure behavior and offered the
explanation that the participants may not have understood the risks of self-disclosure.
Dincelli and Chengalur-Smith (2020) investigated Facebook user self-disclosing by
creating Choose your Own Adventure (CYOA) type trainings. They created both textual
and visual trainings, and tested participant awareness of the risk of self-disclosure by
issuing a questionnaire one month after the training. They found that visual-based
training was reported to be more satisfying and made learning easier. They used a
learning design principle that allowed learner self-reflection and allowed the user to stop
and think about what knowledge was gained. This study also required the user to pause,
so this principle is relevant.
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Albladi and Weir (2020) investigated the influence of Facebook user characteristics
on susceptibility of becoming a victim of a social engineering attack. They used a
questionnaire and a role-play scenario to collect data. They considered as independent
variables user level of involvement in social media, number of social networking
connections, the percentage of known friends in the social network, and social
networking experience. Their goal was to predict user susceptibility to social engineering.
They found that trust is the highest factor that predicts user susceptibility to social
engineering. Other factors in order of influence on user susceptibility were user level of
involvement in social media, cybercrime experience, social networking experience, and
the percentage of known friends on Facebook. They found that fewer social connections
predicted a higher susceptibility to social engineering which they had not expected.
Ross et al. (2018) set out to investigate the effects of two different kinds of warnings
on fake news on Facebook. They used a scenario role-play and a questionnaire to collect
data. They were surprised to learn that no warning was effective, leading to a rejection of
all their hypotheses. In fact, they reported, that Facebook stopped providing warnings for
fake news because the warnings had no effect. Although warnings seemed to have no
effect, they suggested as future research to study different kinds of warning designs and
to study the effect of different demographics on the reactions to the warnings.
Terlizzi et al. (2017) investigated the effect of a fake Facebook profile on user
willingness to friend that profile and provide sensitive information to that profile. They
found that, while bank employees had some caution, more training was needed on the
dangers of social engineering. As future research, they recommended a similar
investigation of other critical sectors such as healthcare and government.
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Ayyagari and Tyks (2012) investigated a case study in which funds were stolen from
a university meal plan. They found that the system administrator who was responsible for
the meal plan system had no training on the system, and that the system itself had never
been secured. Through further investigation, they found that a consultant firm that had
been hired to upgrade the servers used social engineering to steal the credentials
necessary to steal the funds. They concluded that the system needed better security,
including against a social engineering attack, and that any time there is a new system
administrator for the meal plan system, that that system administrator should be trained
on the system.
A number of studies surveyed investigated social engineering with respect to robotics
(Aroyo et al., 2018; Booth et al., 2017). Aroyo et al. (2018) stated that the goal of their
study was to see how trust towards robots can be used for social engineering. They
created a humanoid robot and created an Easter-egg hunt in which participants were
asked individually to find the eggs in the presence of the robot. Before the hunt began,
the robot participated in small talk with the participant. The goal of the small talk was to
have the robot gain the trust of the participant. Part of the small talk was that the robot
asked for personal information. When the participant was asked to begin the hunt, the
robot offered hints to egg locations. Participants who found all the eggs in the hunt were
offered a gamble: they could hunt for a bonus egg for double-or-nothing reward. The
robot encouraged the gamble, and 100% of the participants who were offered the gamble
took it. When asked afterwards why they listened to the robot, some of the participants
stated that they trusted the robot because the robot had no reason to lie. The implication
of this study is that people tend to trust entities that truly have no reason to be trusted.

25

Booth et al. (2017) also used a robot to test reaction to a social engineering attack. In
their study, they created a small mobile robot that waited at the entrance to a secure
dormitory entrance and asked passers-by to let it into the building. They found that
groups of people were more likely to let the robot in than individuals. They also found
that people were more willing to let the robot in if the robot claimed to be delivering
food. One participant asked the robot if it had authorization to enter the building, but then
let the robot in anyway when the robot did not answer the question. As with the Aroyo et
al. study, Booth et al. (2017) stated that over trust in a robot can create a significant
security threat.
Overall, these studies in social engineering illustrate the significant threat that social
engineering presents. People seem to believe that they are safe from social engineering
because they will recognize an attempt. But these studies show that even experts in IT
security can fall for a social engineering attack. Also, people seem to trust entities that
have no reason to be trusted such as an unknown Facebook profile or a robot. While
training does seem to mitigate the effect of social engineering, many times a social
engineering attack works because the victim is not alert to the attack. This fact gives
relevance to this study, which attempted to move the user into an alert mode of thinking.
The studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1
Summary of Social Engineering Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Abass, 2018

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Presented suggestions for
protection against social
engineering

Albladi & Weir,
2020

Experimental

316
Participants

Questionnaire,
Role-Play
Scenario

Developed a conceptual model
to test factors that influence
vulnerability on social media

Algarni et al.,
2017

Empirical,
Grounded
Theory &
Survey

370
Employees
from 3
Organizations

Role-Play &
Questionnaire

Identified user characteristics as
significant predictors of social
engineering victimization

Aroyo et al.,
2018

Experiment

61 Healthy
Italians

Interactive
Robot &
Questionnaire

Robots could become a powerful
tool for social engineers

Ayyagari &
Tyks, 2012

Case Study

One Incident
at a University
in Idaho

Interviews

Illustrated IT security issues in
an educational setting

Biros et al., 2002

Field
Experiment

206 Military
Personnel

Simulation

Warnings and JIT training can
promote deception detection

Booth et al.,
2018

Experimental

108 University
Students

Scenario &
Interview

Overtrust in robots can represent
a significant threat

Bullée et al.,
2015

Experimental

118
Employees

Simulation
Role-Play

Creating awareness of dangers
of social engineering helps to
neutralize attack

Cheung et al.,
2015

Experimental
& Empirical

405 Facebook
Users

CrossSectional
Survey

Social influence is indicated to
be strongest effect on selfdisclosure.

Dincelli et al.,
2020

Experimental
& Design
Science
Research

1718
Employees

Gamified
Artifact,
Surveys &
Vignettes

The gamified artifact reduced
online-self disclosure
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Table 1
Summary of Social Engineering Literature – (continued)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Fleming, 2017

Grounded
Theory & Case
Study

15 Public
School
Teachers or
Administrators

Open-Ended
Telephone
Interviews

Training is needed to mitigate
unauthorized release of NPI
and PII

Training improved
understanding of deception but
did not improve detection
ability

George et al.,
2004

Field
Experiment

125 Air Force
Officers

Lecture and/or
ComputerBased
Training and
Judgement and
Knowledge
Tests

Jain et al., 2016

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Emphasized human element as
biggest threat to the security of
a company

Krombholz et al.,
2015

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Created taxonomy of social
engineering attacks

Medlin et al.,
2008

Experimental

118 Hospital
Employees

Questionnaire

Employees are willing to share
personal information

Mensch &
Wilke, 2011

Exploratory

127 Graduate
and
Undergraduate
Students

CrossSectional
Survey

Security attitudes among
college students tend to be low;
Recommended training

Mitnick &
Simon, 2003

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Introduced model for social
engineers

Ross et al., 2018

Experimental

151
Participants

Scenario &
Questionnaire

Warnings are ineffective in
alerting user to false
information
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Table 1
Summary of Social Engineering Literature – (continued)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Salahdine &
Kaabouch,
2019

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Categorized social engineering
attacks

Terlizzi et al.,
2017

Empirical

500 Brazilian
Bank
Employees &
100 Other
RandomlySelected
Individuals

Simulation

Training is recommended to
mitigate data leakage on social
media

Workman,
2008

Experimental
Field Study

612 Employees
of a Fortune
500 Company

Questionnaire
&
Observation

Clarified which kind of
intervention is most effective

Wang et al.,
2021

Case Study

16 Social
Engineering
Attacks

Conceptual
Model

The model provides a conceptual
visualization of social
engineering

Phishing
Finn and Jakobsson (2007) categorized phishing studies into three groups: survey,
closed-lab experiment, and simulation. A survey study presents the participants with a
survey asking what their reaction to an event would be (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). BravoLillo et al. (2011) used an interview survey to understand perception of risk of a chosen
action. A closed-lab experiment is one in which participants are aware of the focus of the
study, and, therefore, their results may be skewed. An example of a closed-lab
experiment is Algarni et al.’s 2017 study. They used a role-play questionnaire in which
participants were shown Facebook profiles and then asked about the trustworthiness of
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those profiles (Algarni et al., 2017). Algarni et al. (2017) acknowledged that participant
reaction may be skewed because the participants were aware of the study.
The third kind of study according to Finn and Jakobsson (2007) is a simulation study
in which the research design mimics a real-world scenario and the participants are
unaware of the study. Finn and Jakobsson (2007) discussed ethical considerations with
regard to simulation studies. Simulation studies seem to be the most widely used of the
three types of studies, as they have been used to understand phishing behavior (Burns et
al., 2019; Goel et al., 2017; Gordon, Wright, Glynn, et al., 2019), Musuva et al. (2019)
used an simulation study which had to be curtailed because a social media activist sent
out an alert regarding the phishes in the investigation which led the university to end the
study. To avoid ethical dilemmas, this study was a closed-lab field experiment.
While phishing is only one of 20 different kinds of social engineering defined by
Salahdine and Kaabouch (2019), they stated that phishing is the most common type of
social engineering attack. Thompson (2012) stated that many attacks start with a bad user
decision and that anyone can be tricked by a phishing attack. Several studies presented a
variety of taxonomies (Gupta et al., 2018; Rastenis et al., 2020; Salahdine & Kaabouch,
2019). Salahdine and Kaabouch (2019) organized phishing attacks into five categories:
spear, whaling, vishing, interactive voice response, and BEC while Rastenis et al. (2020)
gave a wider definition, which included the devices and other media used. Gupta et al.
(2018) offered a taxonomy based on the phases of a phishing attack. A spear phishing
attack is one in which the attacker targets a particular group of people, such as employees
of a particular company or users of a particular website (Halevi et al., 2015). A whaling
attack is a subset of a spear phishing attack in which the high-profile members of the
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target group are targeted (Gupta et al., 2018). A vishing attack is a phone attack in which
the attacker convinces the victim to give up some piece of confidential information
(Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019), and an interactive voice response attack is a subset of a
vishing attack in which the attacker pretends to be an interactive voice-controlled
computer (Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019). A BEC attack is one in which the attacker
pretends to be a high-ranking member of the victim’s organization and asks for a secure
transaction, such as a transfer of funds (Zweighaft, 2017). When the victim completes the
transfer, the funds transfer to the attacker.
Rastenis et al. (2020) suggested a taxonomy for phishing that categorized the
communication media, target devices, and attack techniques. The communication media
categories were email, website, Instant Messenger, online social networks, blogs and
forums, mobile apps, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). The target devices
category included PCs, smart phones, voice devices (VoIP & phone), and Wireless
Fidelity (Wi-Fi) devices. The attack techniques categories were attack initialization, data
collection, and system penetration. Gupta et al. (2018) created a taxonomy based on the
phases of creating an e-mail-based phishing attack. Those phases were (1) E-mail address
selection, (2) E-mail content creation, (3) Sending the e-mail to recipients, (4) Waiting
for the response from the e-mail recipients, (5) Phishing attack results and data gathering,
(6) Usage of gathered results and data. Gupta et al. (2018) described e-mail address
selection as how the attacker chooses which e-mail address to use, and included choosing
known, existing addresses and generated address that would be verified in a later phase.
E-mail content creation included the categories of presentation, creation strategy,
personalized or not, and created by human or robot. The presentation category included a
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benefit, a request, important information, or a possible failure. Creation strategy included
generated, edited, or duplicated. A generated e-mail is new text for a specific phishing
campaign. An edited e-mail is changed from a legitimate e-mail. A duplicated e-mail is
copied from another source and not changed at all. Sending the e-mail to recipients
included the categories of individual or group and systematic or not. Phishing attack
results and data gathering included gathering secret data such as credentials, financial or
company data, and validated e-mail addresses. Lastly, usage of gathered results included
unauthorized access and financial fraud.
Several studies focused on spear-phishing (Burns et al., 2019; Butavicius et al., 2015;
Halevi et al., 2015; Hanus et al., 2021; Mihelič et al., 2019; Oliveira et al., 2017), and all
of the studies ran a simulated phishing campaign. Sample populations included students
(Butavicius et al., 2015), employees from one large organization (Burns et al., 2019;
Halevi et al., 2015; Mihelič et al., 2019), and residence of a geographic area (Oliveira et
al., 2017). Butavicius et al. (2015) acknowledged that their sample population of students
was a limitation and suggested future research that expanded the sample population.
Halevi et al. (2015) and Oliveira et al. (2017) both investigated the demographics of their
sample population and both found that women were more vulnerable to spear-phishing
than men. More specifically, Oliveira et al. (2017) found that older women were the most
vulnerable subset of their sample population. Oliveira et al. (2017) recommended
correlating the volume of email received in a day with susceptibility to phishing, which
this research did, and tailoring anti-phishing training tools to older people. Mihelič et al.
(2019) found that phishing campaigns can be successful even if target's response time is
short. Hanus et al. (2021) used machine learning to predict who would be a victim to
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phishing. They found that spear phishing is more likely to successfully phish the user,
and they found that many demographic factors have bearing on phishing victimization.
They also found that the amount of attention that a user can devote to identifying a phish
is significant. This is relevant to the present study because a goal of this study is to
require the user to give a potential phish more attention.
Oliveira et al. (2017), Butavicius et al. (2015), and Burns et al. (2019) created
treatments based on the framing of the simulated phishes. Oliveira et al. (2017) framed
their phishes according to the following categories: Authority and Legal, Commitment
and Ideological, Liking and Security, Perceptual Contrast and Health, Reciprocation and
Social, Scarcity and Financial, and Social Proof and Social. They found that younger
users were most susceptible to scarcity, while older users were most susceptible to
reciprocation. Burns et al. (2019) framed their phishes according to the following
categories: Group Gain, Group Loss, Individual Gain, and Individual Loss. They found
that training users with individual loss messaging might increase the effectiveness of antiphishing training. Butavicius et al. (2015) framed their phishes according to the following
categories: Authority, Scarcity, and Social Proof. They found that participants were most
susceptible to phishes framed with Authority.
Some of the spear-phishing studies discussed training (Burns et al., 2019; Oliveira et
al., 2017). Burns et al. (2019) found that over half of their participants still clicked on a
simulated phish even after training. Because of this result, they concluded that antiphishing training is not effective. In addition, Burns et al. (2019) found that participants
who were less impulsive were more likely to judge phishing as more dangerous. This
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finding relates directly to this study, which aimed to move the user out of the impulsive,
heuristic mindset before choosing to click or not on a potentially malicious link.
Of the studies that investigated non-spear-phishing, three of the studies used
university communities (students, staff, faculty, and surrounding communities) as
participants (Goel et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2017; Musuva et al., 2019). Goel et al.
(2017) invited third- and fourth-year undergraduate students to participate, while Jensen
et al. (2017) and Musuva et al. (2019) invited students, faculty, and staff to participate.
Another common sample was one or more organizations. Gordon, Wright, Glynn, et al.
(2019) used one healthcare organization, whereas Gordon, Wright, Aiyagari, et al. (2019)
used six healthcare organizations. A third type of recruitment was using social media or
solicitation. Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) used Craigslist and flyers posted in bus stops to
recruit participants, and Junger et al. (2017) solicited visitors to a shopping mall. This
study used social media also, recruiting participants from Facebook and LinkedIn.
Of the non-spear-phishing studies, many used a simulation (Goel et al., 2017;
Gordon, Wright, Aiyagari, et al., 2019; Gordon, Wright, Glynn, et al., 2019; Jensen et al.,
2017; Musuva et al., 2019), others used role-play and a survey (Parsons et al., 2019;
Parsons et al., 2015; Rajivan & Gonzalez, 2018), one used open-ended interviews
(Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011), and one used training and warning flyers (Junger et al., 2017).
Many of the studies found that training was necessary (Jensen et al., 2017), but currently
ineffective (Gordon, Wright, Aiyagari, et al., 2019; Junger et al., 2017). Goel et al. (2017)
and Parsons et al. (2015) investigated content and framing in phishing e-mails. Goel et al.
(2017) found that contextual messages that suggest loss, such as losing a scholarship,
were the most effective. Rajivan and Gonzalez (2018) created a two-phase simulation
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with Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users. In the first phase, they asked participants
to craft phishes, and in the second phase, they tested participant reaction to those crafted
phishes. Their results led them to theorize that attackers with higher creativity could be
capable of changing and adapting their emails to evade detection, but their creativity may
not determine their success in persuading end users to respond to their emails. They
suggested for future research that data from this study could be used to develop linguist
models that detect adversarial phishing campaigns, Parsons et al. (2015) found that
people use cues that are not good indicators of whether an email is a phish or genuine.
They investigated cue categories of consistency, links, visual presentation,
personalization, spelling, security, legal, sender, familiarity, urgency, and importance.
They found that users did well on correctly identifying a phish or genuine email when the
visual presentation was professional and when the email was personalized and important.
They found that participants judged a phish poorly when it had an element of urgency. It
may be that requiring the user to wait, as this study did, may overcome the sense of
urgency. Musuva et al. (2019) found that a majority of university community members
will disclose their password in a phishing simulation. They also discussed in depth the
tools they used to launch the simulated phishing campaign so that future studies might
use the same tools. While this study was not a simulated phishing campaign, simulated
phishes were needed and so the discussion on phishing campaign tools is useful.
Many of the studies investigated how user characteristics correlate to phishing
susceptibly (Alseadoon, 2014; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2018; Iuga et al.,
2016; Wang et al., 2016), and one study focused on summarizing URL characteristics in
a safety report (Althobaiti et al., 2021). Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) investigated how novice
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and advanced users use cues to phishing e-mails differently. They concluded that
advanced and novice users do use different cues and arrive at different conclusions
regarding possible risk. They stated that advanced users consider risk before clicking on a
potentially malicious link, while novice users consider risk only after clicking on a
potentially malicious link. Alseadoon (2014) and Iuga et al. (2016) used many of the
same characteristics in their studies, including gender, age, and IT experience. Although
both Alseadoon (2014) and Iuga et al. (2016) used IT experience, they measured the
characteristic differently. Alseadoon (2014) measured how their participants used the
Internet (surfing the web, social media, etc.), how long the participants have been online,
and how much time the participants spend online in a day, and how much email the
participants receive in a day. Iuga et al. (2016) measured whether their participants have
been victims of phishing before, and if the participants have had any phishing awareness
training. Iuga et al. (2016) also used education level. These characteristics are relevant to
this study, which included age, gender, education level, attention span, and the volume of
email received in a day. As with Halevi et al. (2015) and Oliveira et al. (2017), Iuga et al.
(2016) also found that a participant’s gender, as well as years of IT experience, have a
statistically significant impact on the detection rate of phishing. Interestingly, Alseadoon
(2014) found younger users more vulnerable to phishing, which contradicts the findings
of Oliveira et al. (2017). Chen et al. (2018) investigated how trust in automated detection
systems influences susceptibility to phishing. They found that system reliability has a
profound influence on human performance. Wang et al. (2016) measured overconfidence,
using two metrics of overconfidence, over estimation and over-precision. They
hypothesized that cognitive effort reduces overconfidence, which is relevant to this study
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since this study worked to require cognitive effort in the user. Wang et al. (2016) found
that their hypothesis was supported. Althobaiti et al. (2021) created a URL feature report
and tested it with eight focus group sessions. The focus groups included HCI experts,
security experts, and students. The results showed that the groups generally liked the
report and found that the report helped them to focus on the safety of the URL.
Some studies introduced a scale or model to explain phishing behavior (Parsons et
al., 2019; Steves et al., 2020; Vishwanath et al., 2018). Parsons et al. (2019) and
Vishwanath et al. (2018) created scales to measure factors in user behavior that leads to
falling for a phish. Parsons et al. (2019) introduced the Susceptibility to Persuasion
Strategies Scale which measured the authority, consistency, liking, reciprocity, scarcity,
and social proof components of a phish. They tested the scale with a phishing simulation,
and found that users who were susceptible to authority, liking, scarcity, social proof were
more susceptible to phishing. They also stated that the findings showed that users tend to
be susceptible situational impulsivity and suggested that teaching users to use systematic
versus heuristic principles would be useful. This suggestion is directly relevant to this
study since the goal of this study was to move the user into a systematic mindset.
Vishwanath et al. (2018) built a model that accounts for the cognitive, preconscious, and
automatic processes that potentially leads to phishing-based deception. Steves et al.
(2020) presented Phish Scale, which is a model to measure simulated phishes for use in a
phishing simulation. This scale was useful for this study since simulated phishes were
conducted in Phase III. The studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2
Summary of Social Engineering: Phishing Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Algarni et al.,
2017

Empirical,
Grounded Theory
& Survey

370 Employees
from 3
Organizations

Role-Play &
Questionnaire

Identified user characteristics
as significant predictors of
social engineering
victimization

Althobaiti et al.,
2021

Empirical

1,278
Employees

Model to
predict user
vulnerability

Model correctly predicted
threats to high-severity cases
96% of time

Alseadoon,
2015

Empirical

780
Undergraduates
in Australia
and Saudi
Arabia

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign &
Survey

A new model to explain the
impact of users’ characteristics
on their detection behavior

Bravo-Lillo et
al., 2011

Phenomenological
& Closed-Lab

10 Novice, 20
Advanced
Users

Open-Ended
Interviews

Advanced and novice users use
different cues and arrive at
different conclusions about
possible risk

Burns et al.,
2019

Empirical &
Simulation

250
Participants
from One
Organization

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign

Anti-phishing training is not
effective

Experimental &
Simulation

121 Students
from a Large
South
Australian
University

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign &
Cognitive
Reflection
Test

Participants who were less
impulsive were more likely to
judge phishing as more
dangerous

System reliability has a
profound influence on human
performance

Butavicius et
al., 2015

Chen et al.,
2018

Experimental &
Simulation

484 MTurk
Users

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign &
SingleQuestion
Survey

Finn &
Jakobsson, 2017

Empirical

Commentary

Phishing
Attacks

Taxonomy for phishing studies

Goel et al., 2017

Theoretical &
Simulation

7,225 Students

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign

Contextual messages that
suggest loss are the most
effective types of phishes
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Table 2
Summary of Social Engineering: Phishing Literature – (continued)

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Empirical &
Simulation

Convenience
Sample of 6
Geographically
Dispersed US
Health Care
Institutions

A Simulated
Phishing Campaign

Simulated phishing campaigns
may serve to educate
employees

Gordon,
Wright, Glenn
et al., 2019

Experimental
& Simulation

516
Employees of
a US
Healthcare
System

A Simulated
Phishing Campaign

A mandatory training program
for the highest-risk employees
did not decrease click rates

Gupta et al.,
2018

Empirical

Commentary

Social Engineering
Attacks

Categorized social engineering
attacks

Hanus et al.,
2021

Empirical

Over 1,400
employees of a
SW US
municipality

Simulation/Machine
Learning

Many demographic factors
have some bearing on phishing
victimization

Halevi et al.,
2015

Experimental
& Simulation

40 Employees
of Large
Indian
Company

A Simulated
Phishing Campaign
& Survey

Vulnerability to phishing is in
part a function of users’
personality

Iuga et al.,
2016

Experimental
& Simulation

382 Online
Participants

A Simulated
Phishing Campaign
& Survey

Gender and the years of PC
usage have a statistically
significant impact on the
detection rate of phishing

Experimental

355 Faculty,
Staff, and
Students at a
Midwestern
University

A Simulated
Phishing Campaign

Presentation of training need
not be complex or costly, but it
is necessary to mitigate
phishing

Study

Gordon,
Wright,
Aiyagari et al.,
2019

Jensen et al.,
2017
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Table 2
Summary of Social Engineering: Phishing Literature – (continued)

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Junger et al., 2017

Experimental

278 Visitors to
a Shopping
Mall

Training Flyer
&
Questionnaire

Neither priming nor a warning
influenced the degree of
disclosure

Musuva et al., 2019

Experimental

241 University
Community
Members

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign

Outlined the actual tools used
to stage the phishing attack in
detail

Oliveira et al.,
2017

Experimental
& Simulation

158
Participants
from North
Central Florida
Area

Phone
Screening &
Survey

Training tools designed for
older population should be
created

Parsons et al., 2015

Experimental
& Closed Lab

59 University
Students

Role-Play and
Survey

People use cues that are not
good indicators of phishing or
genuine email

Mihelič et al., 2019

Case Study &
Simulation

407
Employees
from One
Organization

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign

Phishing campaigns can be
successful even if target's
response time is short

Parsons et al., 2019

Experimental
& Closed Lab

985 Working
Australians

Role-Play &
Web-Based
Survey

Introduced Susceptibility to
Persuasion Strategies Scale

Rajivan &
Gonzalez, 2018

Experimental
& Simulation

105 MTurk
Users

Role-Play &
Survey

Creativity in crafting a phish
may not determine success in
persuading end users to respond
to the phish

Rastenis et al.,
2020

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Categorized social engineering
attacks

Salahdine &
Kaabouch, 2019

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Categorized social engineering
attacks
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Table 2
Summary of Social Engineering: Phishing Literature – (continued)

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Steves et al.,
2020

Exploratory

73 Employees
of NIST

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign

Introduced Phish Scale

Thompson, 2012

Empirical

Commentary

Social
Engineering
Attacks

Discussed dangers of social
engineering attack

Experimental

125
Undergraduate
Students

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign &
Survey

Built a model that accounts for
the cognitive, preconscious,
and automatic processes that
potentially leads to phishingbased deception

Experimental

600
Individuals

A Simulated
Phishing
Campaign &
Survey

Distinguished between
retrospective overconfidence
and perspective
overconfidence

Vishwanath et
al., 2018

Wang et al., 2016

Heuristics
Kahneman’s System One and System Two and Decision Making
In his book Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2011) introduced the concepts of
System One and System Two as methods of describing human cognition. System One
represents an instinctual thought process that comes quickly and automatically and
requires little or no effort. Examples of System One are the ability to orient to a sudden
sound or to detect if one object is closer than another (Kahneman, 2011). System Two is
a slow, methodical thought process that requires deliberate effort. Examples of System
Two are solving a complex mathematical equation or monitoring one’s behavior in a
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social situation (Kahneman, 2011). For typical, daily activities, System One is active, and
System Two is in a low-effort mode. When System One encounters a more difficult task,
it activates System Two. As a difficult task becomes more familiar, System One is able to
take over the task. Kahneman (2011) stated that, given multiple ways to solve a problem,
people will typically choose the path that requires the least amount of effort. As an
illustration, he referenced a study in which college students were asked to solve a simple
mathematical problem with an intuitive answer that was incorrect. The study indicated
that the students did not check their work, although checking their work would have been
easy to do (Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman (2011) also stated that task-switching is
difficult, but that System Two can program the memory to override habit.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) introduced the idea of a heuristic decision-making
process that does not follow Bayesian probability. Kahneman (2011) described a heuristic
as an assumption made to simplify a decision. According to Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), if Bayesian probability were used, there would be evidence of using prior
probabilities when making a decision. They referenced a study in which participants were
given a description of a person in a group and asked if they thought that that person was a
librarian or an engineer. In the study, some participants were told that there were more
engineers than librarians in the group, and some were told that there were more librarians
than engineers in the group. The result was that only the description of the person
affected the participant’s decision (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) explained this departure from Bayesian probability by stating that decision-makers
tend to use heuristic, intuitive judgement although that judgement may be wrong.
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Gigerenzer (1991) countered Tversky and Kahneman (1974) by arguing that
errors in judgement are not violations of probability theory. Gigerenzer (1991) questioned
the methods of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and stated that Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) used too narrow a definition of norm and too highly selected a sample to be used
in traditional probability and statistics. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) answered
Gigerenzer (1991), and stated that only two of the 12 biases they referenced in 1974
apply to Gigerenzer’s argument, and they countered Gigerenzer’s claim that judgement
heuristics are independent of context. In turn, Gigerenzer (1996) stated that the problem
with heuristics is that it can be fit to any situation yet is too vague. Gigerenzer (1996) also
countered the number of biases referenced by Kahneman and Tversky (1996), and stated
that he found 13 biases and that five apply to his former argument. Vranas (2000)
attempted to clear up misunderstandings in the debate between Kahneman and Tversky
(1996) and Gigerenzer (1996). Vranas (2000) stated that Gigerenzer (1996) preferred to
look at cognitive processes underlying decision making and that Gigerenzer (1996) was
not stating that single-case judgements are invalid but that Gigerenzer (1996) wanted
Kahneman and Tversky (1996) to present a proof that they are valid. Vranas (2000)
stated that he did not think a proof was necessary and that Gigerenzer (1996) was
assuming a frequentist view of statistics when it was likely that a subjectivist view was
more appropriate. Both Kahneman and Gigerenzer reviewed Vranas (2000) before it was
published.
A third model of decision making called the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD)
model was introduced by Klein (1993) and used by Rosa et al. (2021). Klein (1993)
described the RPD model as a model in which the decision maker does not make a choice
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between two or more options, but instead acts based on prior experience. Klein (1993)
used the example of a firefighter chief in action at a fire. Asked afterwards how he chose
what to do, the chief stated that he made no conscience choice and simply sprang into
action (Klein, 1993). Rosa et al. (2021) analyzed the decisions of 478 active airline pilots
and categorized the decisions into four groups: adapters, cautious, changers, and
oscillators. They found that adapters made the most successful decisions of the four
groups.
There have been many studies regarding how heuristics may affect user decisionmaking when faced with a computer security decision (Anderson et al., 2016; Bravo-Lillo
et al., 2011; Gerlach et al., 2019). Many of the studies regarding heuristics used some
kind of role-playing methodology in which the participants were given a scenario and
asked for their response, either through interview (Arazy et al., 2017; Bravo-Lillo et al.,
2011) or through action (Anderson et al., 2016; Gerlach et al., 2019). Students appeared
to be common study participants in these types of investigations (Anderson et al., 2016;
Arazy et al., 2017; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011), and one study used a professional firm to
recruit participants (Gerlach et al., 2019). Two of the studies distinguished between
novice and advanced users (Arazy et al., 2017; Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011). Bravo-Lillo et
al. (2011) distinguished advanced users by whether they had taken at least one computer
security course or had worked in the computer security field for at least a year. Arazy et
al. (2017) used professional university librarians as advanced users.
In general, the results of the studies regarding heuristics showed that some level of
misjudgment occurs when heuristics are used (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011; Chang & Chong,
2021; Gerlach et al., 2019). Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) noted that advanced users differ
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from novice users in that advanced users judge risk before taking action while novice
users judge risk after taking an action. Chang and Chong (2021) studied COVID-19 fraud
advisory cases and grouped the cases into a range of psychological vulnerabilities: affect
(a feeling that demarcates the positive or negative quality of a stimulus), availability, cuefamiliarity, representativeness, and scarcity heuristics. They found that users will often
delude themselves into believing that an offer is real because they want it to be so.
Anderson et al. (2016) stated as an implication that methods that reduce habituation
should be used when displaying a warning. This implication relates directly to this study
for which the goal was to reduce habituation when displaying a warning by displaying a
countdown or count-up timer with the warning. The stated implication of Arazy et al.
(2017) was that measuring heuristics is difficult. The studies described in this section are
summarized in Table 3.
Table 3
Summary of Kahneman’s System One and System Two and Decision-Making Literature

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Anderson et al.,
2016

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

25 Participants
from
University
Community

fMRI

Polymorphic warnings are more
effective than static warnings

Empirical,
Survey, &
Closed-Lab

12
Undergraduates
for
Quantitative &
3 Senior
Librarians for
Qualitative

Survey Using
7-Point Likert
Scale &
Think-Aloud

Assessments that are formed by
agreement may still suffer from
bias

Azary et al.,
2017
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Table 3
Summary of Kahneman’s System One and System Two and Decision-Making Literature –
(continued)

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Bravo-Lillo et
al., 2011

Phenomenological &
Closed-Lab

10 Advanced
Users and 20
Novice Users

A Warning
Dialog &
Open-Ended
Interviews

Novice users often don’t
consider sensitivity of
information they release;
Phishing warning should warn
of sensitivity of information

Chang &
Chong, 2021

Case Study

Fraud
advisories and
cases

Model of five
heuristic
vulnerabilities

Identified range of five
psychological vulnerabilities

Gerlach et al.,
2019

Survey &
Closed-Lab

321
Participants
Recruited
Through
Professional
Survey Firm

Pre-Existing
News Mobile
App &
Questionnaire

High level of stereotypical
thinking and systematic
misjudgment shown

Gigerenzer,
1991

Grounded
Theory

Decision
Makers

A Scenario in
Which a
Decision Must
be Made

Countered Kahneman's finding
that decision makers use
heuristics rather than statistical
probability

Gigerenzer,
1996

Grounded
Theory

Decision
Makers

A Scenario in
Which a
Decision Must
be Made

Countered Kahneman and
Tversky (1996)

Kahneman,
2011

Empirical

Decision
Makers

A Scenario in
Which a
Decision Must
be Made

The structures of System One
and System Two

Kahneman &
Tversky, 1973

Grounded
Theory

Predictors

A Scenario in
Which a
Prediction
Must be Made

Previous information tends not
to be used when making a
prediction
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Table 3
Summary of Kahneman’s System One and System Two and Decision-Making Literature –
(continued)

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Decision
Makers

A Scenario in
Which a
Decision Must
be Made

"To correct Gigerenzer's
(1991) misleading description
of our work and his
tendentious presentation of the
evidence" pg. 583

Introduced RecognitionPrimed Decision (RPD) model

Kahneman &
Tversky, 1996

Grounded
Theory

Klein, 1993

Phenomenological &
Closed-Lab

Firefighter
Commanders

A Scenario in
Which an
Automatic
Reaction is
Required

Rosa et al., 2021

Empirical

478 Active
Pilots

Simulation

Adapters were most successful
of four coded groups

Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973

Grounded
Theory

Decision
Makers

A Scenario in
Which a
Decision Must
be Made

Introduced the idea of a
heuristic decision-making
process that does not follow
Bayesian probability

Habituation
In addition to cybersecurity, habituation is also a topic of interest in driver safety
studies and in marketing. All the driver safety studies discussed here used a driving
simulator to test driver habituation (Aminuddin & Nasir, 2019; Baldwin et al., 2017; He
et al., 2011; Super et al., 2016; Zhang & Kumada, 2017). Three of the studies used an
Electroencephalogram (EEG) to measure user reaction and habituation (Aminuddin &
Nasir, 2019; Baldwin et al., 2017; Super et al., 2016). Some of the studies discovered that
some kind of stimulation helps the driver to not habituate and leads the driver to be more
aware of their surroundings. The stimulations used differed. Aminuddin and Nasir (2019)
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used a radio, He et al. (2011) simulated heavy wind, Super et al. (2016) used recorded
speech, and both Baldwin et al. (2017) as well as Zhang and Kumada (2017) asked their
participants to do a measured task between driving simulations. These stimulations
related to this study since a countdown or count-up timer can be considered a form of
stimulation. Baldwin et al. (2017) stated that the main contribution of their study was that
they were able to detect the internal cognitive state while driving. They stated that the
implication of this contribution was that identifying periods of likely mind wandering
could serve as a useful research tool for assessment of driver attention and could
potentially lead to future in-vehicle safety countermeasures.
Consumer marketing is another area in which habituation is of interest. Martin (2008)
advised marketers to “treat consumers like dogs” (p. 147) while using the concepts of
behavioral conditioning when developing an advertising strategy. A number of studies
concluded that shopping habits should not be overlooked by marketing professionals
(Phang et al., 2018; Soraghan, 2019; Tadajewski, 2019). Mark et al. (2019) concluded
that catalogs are still useful because they help to reinforce shopping habits of consumers.
These studies all used different instruments. Mark et al. (2019) used transaction data of
1,000 customers of one anonymous retailer and a hidden Markov model. Phang et al.
(2018) used a questionnaire to collect data from 180 young adults about their habits of
shopping through a mobile app. Their finding was that hedonic motivation and habits
play the most significant roles in intention to shop via mobile apps. Soraghan (2019) used
observations, think-aloud techniques, and semi-structured interviews to collect data from
26 female shoppers of major United Kingdom grocery stores. She found that label
nudging is not very useful, partially because habits are not overcome. Soraghan (2019)
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speculated that grocery stores create a time pressure, which leads shoppers to use habit to
move more quickly. This speculation is relevant to this study since the countdown or
count-up timer was purposefully designed to slow down the user. Lastly, Tadajewski
(2019) used a genealogical methodology. Specifically, he used theoretical arguments,
conceptual ideas, and practice-based value systems to determine that we are “walking
bundles of habit” (p. 456).
Some studies presented models of consumer behavior that incorporated habituation
(Martin & Morich, 2011; Nadler & McGuigan, 2018; Osman, 2020). Martin and Morich
(2011) and Nadler and McGuigan (2018) both used theoretical commentary to introduce
their models. Martin and Morich (2011) used the categories of pilot, autopilot, and copilot. They defined pilot as the thought process that would be used in a new situation,
which Kahneman (2011) calls System Two. The categories of autopilot and co-pilot
would be both considered System One by Kahneman. Martin and Morich (2011)
differentiated autopilot and co-pilot by stating that autopilot is completely automatic, and
co-pilot is used in situations in which some conscious thought is needed, but not a fully
conscious mind is needed. They stated that heuristics are used in the co-pilot category.
Nadler and McGuigan (2018) encouraged marketers to look for patterns in consumer data
that could be explained by heuristics and habits. Osman (2020) used an open-ended onequestion survey to collect data from 399 volunteers from English-speaking countries. The
question asked for an example in which the unconscious mind was influenced in some
way. The answers were coded, and marketing was the most suggested category of five.
The other four categories were research, therapy, political, and media.
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There have been several studies regarding habituation in cybersecurity. These include
investigating user habituation regarding Android privacy notices (Harbach et al., 2014),
mapping habituation in the brain (Anderson et al., 2014a), the design of privacy notices
(Karegar et al., 2020; Minakawa & Takada, 2017; Sunshine et al., 2009), and recovery
from habituation (Kim & Wogalter, 2009). The types of studies used were closed-lab
experimental (Anderson et al., 2014a; Harbach et al., 2014; Kim & Wogalter, 2009;
Minakawa & Takada, 2017) and closed-lab between-subject studies (Karegar et al., 2020;
Sunshine et al., 2009). The most common sample was students (Anderson et al., 2014a;
Harbach et al., 2014; Kim & Wogalter, 2009; Minakawa & Takada, 2017), although one
used Facebook users (Karegar et al., 2020), and one used Internet users in general
(Sunshine et al., 2009).
All the studies included in this section ran a scenario with some kind of warning
dialog. To gather results, some of the studies used some kind of tracking device, namely
an fMRI (Anderson et al., 2014a), or an eye-tracking device (Karegar et al., 2020), and
some used the time the participants used in interacting with the dialog (Karegar et al.,
2020; Minakawa & Takada, 2017). The time used when interacting with the dialog may
inform the timer value chosen by SMEs in Phase I of this study. Some studies used
whether the warning dialog was clicked in multiple phases (Anderson et al., 2014a;
Harbach et al., 2014; Karegar et al., 2020; Kim & Wogalter, 2009; Minakawa & Takada,
2017). Some used a questionnaire (Karegar et al., 2020; Kim & Wogalter, 2009;
Minakawa & Takada, 2017; Sunshine et al., 2009) and one used a think-aloud
methodology (Sunshine et al., 2009).
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Although all of the studies in this section used scenarios with warning dialogs, most
of them focused on different technologies. Anderson et al. (2014a) as well as Kim and
Wogalter (2009) showed their participants series of images of warnings, Harbach et al.
(2014) investigated user reaction to Android privacy notices, and Karegar et al. (2020)
investigated different types of warning notices that required user interaction. Minakawa
and Takada (2017) showed warning dialogs with sound, animation, and Kawaii, which is
a Japanese word meaning cute (Minakawa & Takada, 2017). In the context of Minakawa
and Takada (2017), Kawaii referred to the traditional Japanese animation form in which
figures are designed to be cute. Sunshine et al. (2009) used Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
certificate warning notices.
The results of using warnings were mixed. Most of the studies found warnings to be
useful (Harbach et al., 2014; Karegar et al., 2020; Kim & Wogalter, 2009; Sunshine et al.,
2009), but two did not (Anderson et al., 2014a; Minakawa & Takada, 2017). Rather than
investigating whether warnings were useful, Anderson et al. (2014a) set out to map the
area of the brain that was active when the users viewed the series of warnings. The brain
mappings showed that the participants’ visual area of the brain sharply decreased as they
continued to view the warnings. They concluded that users cannot help but to ignore
warnings to which they have habituated. This is relevant to this study since the
countdown or count-up timer changed, and thus reduce habituation. Harbach et al. (2014)
found that customized Android privacy notices were more effective than standard privacy
notices. They reported that many participants chose not to allow the installation because
of the personalized notice showing actual data. Overall, Harbach et al. (2014) found that
the personalized privacy message led participants to take notice when they would have
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otherwise dismissed the message without considering it. Karegar et al. (2020) found that
the number of participants who used a drag-and-drop interface and who could recall why
they shared data was significantly higher than participants in the other treatment groups.
Kim and Wogalter (2009) found that user attention decreased as the warnings continued.
Minakawa and Takada (2017) found that the Kawaii effect significantly decreased
habituation when compared to the control group. Sunshine et al. (2009) found that the
participants were more likely to heed the SSL warning notice when higher-risk website
such as a bank website, and that participants tended to ignore the warning notice when
accessing a lower-risk website such as a library website. Like Harbach et al. (2014), they
also found that the custom warning notices were more likely to guide the participant into
the correct action. Sunshine et al. (2009) stated that the best-case scenario would be to
not show warnings at all, but rather to simply block access to websites that are not
authorized by an SSL certificate, but they acknowledged that that scenario would be hard
to accomplish.
Of the studies that stated future work, most of them suggested replicating their study
with some kind of change (Harbach et al., 2014; Karegar et al., 2020; Minakawa &
Takada, 2017). Karegar et al. (2020) stated that they would like to replicate phase two of
the study at a future time, recognizing the priming effect of the questionnaire. They stated
as an implication of their findings that drag-and-drop privacy dialogs should be
developed and used. Minakawa and Takada (2017) stated that they would like to repeat
their study, stating that the novelty of using Kawaii in this manner may have affected the
results. Harbach et al. (2014) stated that they would like to study the long-term effect of
customized Android privacy warnings. Anderson et al. (2014a) suggested using these
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findings to develop warnings to reduce habituation as future work and stated as an
implication of their study that any warning design should take habituation into
consideration. This is relevant to this study since the warning design was meant to take
habituation into account. Kim and Wogalter (2009) suggested incorporating text color
and size into warning notices. This study incorporated text color into the warning text.
Overall, the studies in this section confirmed the presence of user habituation when
viewing warning notices. It was found that warning notices that change (Minakawa &
Takada, 2017), incorporate personal data (Harbach et al., 2014; Sunshine et al., 2009), or
require some kind of user interaction (Karegar et al., 2020) are the most effective to
reduce user habituation. Two of studies in this section recommended taking user
habituation into account when designing warning dialogs (Anderson et al., 2014a; Kim &
Wogalter, 2009). The studies described in this section are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4
Summary of Heuristics: Habituation Literature
Instrument/
Constructs
Driving
Simulator &
EEG

Study

Methodology

Sample

Aminuddin &
Nasir, 2019

Experimental

20 Healthy
Subjects

Anderson et al.,
2014

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

24
Undergraduate
and Graduate
Students

fMRI

Located specific region in
brain that exhibits habituation

Baldwin et al.,
2017

Experimental

9 Participants

Driving
Simulator &
EEG

Detected the internal cognitive
state while driving

36 Students

Android App
Permission
Dialogs,
Questionnaire
& ThinkAloud

Users that receive
personalized permission
warning dialogs were
significantly less likely to
grant the requested permission

Harbach et al.,
2014

Survey,
Narrative, &
Closed-Lab

Main Findings or Contribution
Driving focus is better if there
is stimulation
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Table 4
Summary of Heuristics: Habituation Literature – (continued)

Study

He et al., 2011

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Experimental

18 Members of
the University
of Illinois
Community

Driving
Simulator &
Eye and Head
Tracker

Mind wandering can engender
a failure to monitor the
environment while driving.

Drag and drop action resulted
in significantly more user
attention

Karegar et al.,
2020

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

80 Facebook
Users

Privacy
Notices,
Questionnaire,
& Eye
Tracking

Kim & Wogalter,
2009

Survey &
Closed-Lab

72 University
Students

Repeated
Visual
Warnings &
Questionnaire

Attention decreased as
warnings continued

Mark et al., 2019

Experimental

1000
Customers of
One
Anonymous
Retailer

Transaction
Data & Hidden
Markov Model

Catalogs help to reinforce
habit in customers

Martin & Morich,
2011

Empirical

Commentary

Literature
Review

Presents new model of
consumer behavior that
incorporates heuristics

Minakawa &
Takada, 2017

Experimental
& Closed-Lab

16 University
Students

Security
Warning
Dialogs &
Questionnaire

Effect of only Kawaii does not
appear to reduce habituation,
but dialog with audio,
animation, and Kawaii does

Nadler &
McGuigan, 2018

Empirical

Commentary

Behavioral
Economic
Model

Discusses a model in which
behavioral economics depends
on heuristics and habit

Experimental

399
Volunteers
from EnglishSpeaking
Countries

Open-Question
Survey

Marketing was the most
mentioned category of ways in
which the unconscious mind is
influenced

Experimental

180 Young
Adult
Consumers

Questionnaire

Hedonic motivation and habits
play the most significant roles
in intention to shop via mobile
apps

Osman, 2020

Phang et al., 2018
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Table 4
Summary of Heuristics: Habituation Literature – (continued)

Study

Soraghan, 2019

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Ethnographic

26 Female
Shoppers from
Major UK
Grocery Stores

Observations,
Think-Aloud
Techniques, &
SemiStructured
Interviews

Label nudging is not very
useful, partially because habits
are not overcome

Sunshine et al.,
2009

Narrative &
Closed-Lab

100 Internet
Users

SSL Warning
Dialogs &
Think-Aloud

Custom warnings were headed
more significantly than
standard warnings. Users still
ignored warnings and
misunderstood why warnings
were triggered.

Super et al.,
2016

Experimental

7 Healthy
Subjects

Driving
Simulator &
EEG

Meaningful sound can avoid
habituation

Marketing must orient towards
habit-creation

Lower mental workload leads
to mind-wondering

Tadajewski,
2019

Genealogical

Consumers

Theoretical
Arguments,
Conceptual
Ideas, &
Practice-Based
Value Systems

Zhang &
Kumada, 2017

Experimental

40 Participants

Driving
Simulator

Security in Mobile Devices
When compared to phishing using a desktop computer, phishing using a mobile
device has not been widely studied (Bottazzi et al., 2015; Mukhopadhyay & Argles,
2011). A number of sources offered a taxonomy of mobile device attacks and discussed
the unique security challenges that mobile devices present (Amro, 2018; Bitton et al.,
2018; Chorghe & Shekokar, 2016; Goel & Jain, 2018; Ndibwile et al., 2017; Virvilis et
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al., 2014). Bitton et al. (2018) categorized attacks into Applications, Communications and
Browsing, Communication Channels, and Devices. Applications refers to exploits
embedded in mobile apps, and Communication and Browsing refers to the data that
passes between the user and the attacker. This is differentiated from Communication
Channels in that Communication Channels refers to the channel technology itself.
Examples include peripherals such as a memory card or an open Wi-Fi network. The
Devices category includes vulnerabilities stemming from the device itself, such as an
unlocked or jail-broken smart phone. Amro (2018) categorized phishing attacks into
BEC, Service Updates, Promotional Offers, Spear Phishing, and Whaling. A Service
Update attack mimics a service update request from a legitimate service such as Drop
Box or Google Drive (Amro, 2018). A Promotional Offers attack mimics a promotional
offer to obtain goods such as coupons, tickets, or gifts (Amro, 2018). Joo et al. (2017)
classified smishing attacks as Application-based, Web-based, and Network-based.
Smishing is an amalgamation of Short Message Service (SMS) and phishing and is used
to describe SMS-based phishing attacks.
Challenges unique to a mobile device platform include a smaller screen which leads
users not to see certain phishing cues that they might in a larger screen (Goel & Jain,
2018; Ndibwile et al., 2019) and which requires that some browser features be
eliminated, including anti-phishing security features (Ndibwile et al., 2017; Virvilis et al.,
2014). URLs are usually hidden by default in a mobile browser, decreasing user attention
to any phishing cues in the URL (Chorghe & Shekokar, 2016). Users do not give as much
attention to cues in mobile device browsers as they do in desktop browsers because of the
smaller screen (Amro, 2018). Users also tend to trust their mobile device because their
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device is usually close to them (Amro, 2018). Goel and Jain (2018) discussed the security
challenge of the physical mobile device, which typically has additional vulnerabilities
such as a camera, the user’s physical location, and access to SMS.
Anti-phishing techniques suggested include blacklists (Amro, 2018; Chorghe &
Shekokar, 2016; Goel & Jain, 2018; Virvilis et al., 2014), detecting a suspicious app
(Chorghe & Shekokar, 2016), inspecting packets originating from an HTTPS get request
(Bottazzi et al., 2015), using a QR code (Chorghe & Shekokar, 2016; Mukhopadhyay &
Argles, 2011), using a lightweight phishing detection algorithm in a browser (Liu et al.,
2021; Ndibwile et al., 2017; Ndibwile et al., 2019), and checking a URL for an Internet
Protocol (IP) address (Wu et al., 2014). Blacklists are imperfect because they must be
updated and therefore cannot detect a zero-day attack (Chorghe & Shekokar, 2016; Goel
& Jain, 2018). A zero-day attack is one in which the vulnerabilities which an attack
exposes are exploited on the same day on which the attack is exposed to the public (Goel
& Jain, 2018). Chorghe and Shekokar (2016) stated as future work their intent to
implement an anti-phishing tool that will be able to detect a zero-day attack, and Virvilis
et al. (2014) stated plans to further study the effectiveness on blacklists in anti-phishing
techniques on mobile platforms. Orunsolu et al. (2017) stated future work plans to set
more powerful rules for URL detection and to include source code in the verifier. A
number of studies presented algorithms that use machine learning, including a naïve
Bayesian algorithm (Bottazzi et al., 2015; Joo et al., 2017; Kumar & Chaudhary, 2017;
Orunsolu et al., 2017). Wu et al. (2014) presented an application that uses optical
character recognition to extract text from a mobile device screenshot. From the extracted
text, the application identifies the sender and URL. If the identity of the sender and the
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URL are different, the app sends a warning to the user. Ndibwile et al. (2017) presented
UnPhishMe, which is an algorithm that simulates a user login with invalid credentials and
detects phishing based on the website’s response. Liu et al. (2021) used a neural network
to create a malicious webpage detection model. The found that the framework they built
had a higher detection efficiency when compared to similar frameworks. Orunsolu et al.
(2017) presented a lightweight Android app that works by verifying the URL of the target
web page.
Two of the studies investigated user awareness of security risks in a smartphone
environment (Koyuncu & Pusatli, 2019; Ophoff & Robinson, 2014). Both studies
surveyed smartphone users; one surveyed smartphone users by taking an in-person poll in
a Turkish shopping center (Koyuncu & Pusatli, 2019), and another used an online
questionnaire to survey South African smartphone users (Ophoff & Robinson, 2014).
Both studies found smartphone security awareness to be low, and both found that some
kind of knowledge (formal education (Ophoff & Robinson, 2014) and IT expertise
(Koyuncu & Pusatli, 2019)) to be a positive influence on security awareness. Koyuncu
and Pusatli (2019) used age as a demographic and found that the oldest demographic
(older than 50) had the lowest security awareness, followed by the youngest demographic
(younger than 21). Ophoff and Robinson (2014) suggested as future work to investigate
the influence of gender on security awareness. Both age and gender were demographic
variables in this study.
Of the studies reviewed, the next most common characteristic of interest after security
awareness was security attitude. Three studies reviewed investigated security attitude
among smartphone users (Alsaleh et al., 2017; Chin et al., 2012; Imgraben et al., 2014).
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As with the studies investigating security awareness, these studies also used some kind of
survey to investigate the attitudes of smartphone users. Alsaleh et al. (2017) used
structured interviews. Chin et al. (2012) also used structured interviews, but then
followed up the interviews with observations. Imgraben et al. (2014) used paper and
online surveys. While the overall contribution from Imgraben et al. (2014) was that users
do not perceive a security threat on their smartphones, they did report that just over half
of the users surveyed reported that they would not open an email from an unknown
source. In addition Imgraben et al. (2014) reported that 70% of their users would not
accept a Facebook friend request from an unknown source. In contrast to the overall
result reported by Imgraben et al. (2014), Chin et al. (2012) reported that users are more
concerned with smartphone security than with laptop security. Participants reported that
they are less likely to do high-security tasks, such as check a bank account or enter a
social security number on a smartphone, because of security concerns. Alsaleh et al.
(2017) investigated the factors related to user smartphone security attitude. They reported
that some users lock their smartphone mostly because they do not want friends or family
members to be able to access their phone, but also that some users do not lock their
smartphone because they feel as though they have nothing to protect. Implication of these
studies included the idea that smartphone app designers could include security indicators
in their apps (Chin et al., 2012) and improve support for user-oriented security features
(Alsaleh et al., 2017).
Several studies investigated user security behavior with smartphones (Chassidim et
al., 2020; Chen & Li, 2017; Das & Khan, 2016; Mi et al., 2020; Ngoqo & Flowerday,
2015; Nowitz, 2018; Nowrin & Bawden, 2018). Several of these studies also used
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surveys (Chen & Li, 2017; Das & Khan, 2016; Mi et al., 2020; Nowrin & Bawden,
2018), but two used a mobile app mockup (Chassidim et al., 2020; Lindegren et al.,
2021), one used a simulated phishing campaign (Nowitz, 2018), and one used an
awareness measurement tool and scorecard (Ngoqo & Flowerday, 2015). Nowitz (2018)
used phishes that had previously gotten through a university filter as a basis for the
simulated phishes in their study. Nevertheless, they reported that the study was cut short
because their simulated phishes were reported as suspicious. This study required require
simulated phishes, and, while the technique of using previous actual phishes as a basis
may be useful, the fact that the phishes were reported as suspicious may negate the
usefulness of the technique. All of these studies used smartphone users as participants,
and some used university community members including students (Mi et al., 2020;
Ngoqo & Flowerday, 2015; Nowrin & Bawden, 2018) and staff members (Nowitz, 2018).
Ngoqo and Flowerday (2015) included gender in their demographics and noted that males
tended to be more security aware than females. Two of these studies were longitudinal in
nature (Mi et al., 2020; Ngoqo & Flowerday, 2015). Chen and Li (2017) reported that
anticipated regret may influence user security actions and recommended emotion-based
warnings. This is relevant to this study in that emotional reaction was expected, but the
goal of this study was to mitigate that emotional reaction. Chen and Li (2017) also
recommended security training that emphasizes personal skill and knowledge. Nowitz
(2018) also discussed emotional reaction, stating that users are more susceptible to a
message indicating gain than to a message indicating loss. Das and Khan (2016) found
that user security behavior is low and warned that user security behavior puts
organizations at risk. They reported that Android users exhibited higher security behavior
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that Apple users. While this study did not differentiate between Android and Apple users,
both were in the study by design, and the data between the two types of users could be
analyzed in future research. Mi et al. (2020) found that user planning and self-control of
actions mediated the relationship between user intention and user security behavior.
Chassidim et al. (2020) also investigated user intent to install security applications. They
found that intention to install increases as more security features are offered and that
users are willing to compromise on medium levels of privacy intrusiveness. They
proposed visual indicators at install time to let users know which apps have security
features. Lindegren et al. (2021) used a mobile app to test user reaction to dialogs, dragand-drop, and swiping interfaces. Their goal was to slow the user down and cause the
user to think about the pending action. This study is relevant to the present study because
a goal of the present study is to cause the user to pause and think about the pending
action. In addition, Lindegren et al. (2021) used age, gender, and education level as
demographics, which are also used in this study. Nowrin and Bawden (2018) observed
moderate security behavior among users and noted that not all mobile security features
were used equally. They suggested as future work to expand the study to other
universities and stated that their study could help educators raise information security
awareness among students and help authorities create appropriate strategies. Ngoqo and
Flowerday (2015) proposed a framework which can be used to forecast the information
security behavior profiles of student mobile phone user. The studies discussed in this
section are summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5
Summary of Security in Mobile Devices Literature

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Alsaleh et al.,
2017

Experimental

30 Smartphone
Users

Structured
Qualitative
Interviews

Identified factors that could
influence smartphone user
security behavior

Amro, 2018

Empirical

Mobile Browser
Users

Anti-Phishing
Techniques in
Mobile Apps

Gave summary of antiphishing techniques for mobile
browsers

Empirical

Mobile Device
Users

Mobile
Phishing
Security
Awareness

Gave taxonomy of mobile
users' security awareness

Bitton et al.,
2018

Bottazzi et al.,
2015

Chassidim et al.,
2020

Case Study

Android Device
Users

MP-Shield
Android App

Presents MP-Shield, an
Android application,
implemented as a proxy
service on top of the TCP/IP
stack

Experimental

300 Smartphone
Users

Mobile App
Mockups

A low privacy invasion might
signal that the security
application provides less
security
Both privacy concern and
coping appraisal have a
significant impact on the
intention to adopt security
defensive software
Users are more apprehensive
about performing privacysensitive tasks on their
smartphones than their
laptops.

Chen & Li, 2017

Experimental

284 Smartphone
Users

Survey

Chin et al., 2012

Experimental

60 Smartphone
Users

Structured
Interviews &
Observations

Chorghe &
Shekokar, 2016

Empirical

Android Device
Users

Anti-Phishing
Techniques on
Android
Devices

Gave summary of antiphishing techniques for mobile
browsers

Das & Khan,
2018

Experimental

500 Smartphone
Users

Face-to-Face
Survey

Overall level of security
behavior is low

62

Table 5
Summary of Security in Mobile Devices Literature – (continued)
Instrument/
Constructs
Phishing and
Anti-Phishing
Techniques in
Mobile Apps

Study

Methodology

Sample

Main Findings or Contribution

Goel & Jain,
2018

Empirical

Mobile Device
Users

Imgraben et al.,
2014

Experimental

250 Smartphone
Users

Survey

Users do not perceive
cybersecurity to be a real threat

Koyuncu &
Pusatli, 2019

Experimental

155 Smartphone
Users

Survey

Awareness level of participants
was fairly low

Lindegren et al.,
2021

Empirical

60 Smartphone
Users

Simulation/P
ost-Test
Questionnaire

Drag-and-drop and swiping
showed better results

An advanced
mobile
malicious
webpage
detection
framework

MMWD has higher detection
efficiency when compared to
similar frameworks

Gave an overview of mobile
phishing attacks and
countermeasures

Liu et al., 2021

Theoretical

Commentary

Mi et al., 2020

Longitudinal
&
Experimental

173 University
Students

Survey

Planning and action control
mediate the relationship
between intention and security
behavior

Empirical

Mobile Device
Users

A Mobile
App Using a
QR Code &
Security
Analysis

Presents anti-phishing singlesign-on QR-code based model
for mobile devices

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

40 Users from
Information
Science,
Biological
Science and
Material Science
Fields

UnPhishMe
Android App
&
Questionnaire

UnPhishMe is effective in
detecting web-based phishing
attacks

206 Users with
Varying
Educational
Background

Smart
Eyeglasses &
Custom
Phishing
Game on
Android
Smartphone

Awareness is not enough to
avoid phishing attacks;
Automatic assistance for
phishing attacks should be
provided

Mukhopadhyay
& Argles, 2011

Ndibwile et al.,
2017

Ndibwile et al.,
2019

Empirical &
Closed-Lab
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Table 5
Summary of Security in Mobile Devices Literature – (continued)

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Ngoqo &
Flowerday,
2015

Longitudinal
Action
Research

90 University
Students

Awareness
Measurement
Tool and
Scorecard

Proposed a new method for
tracking and categorizing student
mobile phone user security
behavioral profiles

Nowitz, 2018

Field
Experiment

141 University
Staff Members

Simulated
Phishing
Campaign

Users are more susceptible to
gain message than loss message

Nowrin &
Bawden, 2018

Experimental

348 University
Students

Quantitative
Survey

Moderate security behavior was
observed; Users did not use
mobile security features equally

Ophoff &
Robinson, 2014

Exploratory &
Experimental

619 South
African
Smartphone
Users

Questionnaire

Found association between
expertise and adoption of
smartphone security controls

Empirical

Android Device
Users

An Android
App That is a
Lightweight
Anti-Phishing
URL Verifier

An Android app that is a
lightweight anti-phishing URL
verifier

Empirical

5 Desktop
Browsers and
Their Mobile
Counterparts

Manuel
Inspection of
Phishing
URLs

Many mobile browsers do not
sufficiently protect the user
against phishing

Orunsolu et al.,
2017

Virvilis et al.,
2014

Phishing Mitigation Techniques
Polymorphic Dialogs
A polymorphic dialog is one that changes in appearance each time it displays
(Anderson et al., 2016; Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007; Egelman et al., 2008).
Overall, all the studies in this section found polymorphic warnings to be more effective
than static warnings. In particular, Vance et al. (2018) found that polymorphic dialogs
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were heeded more significantly after three weeks than static dialogs. De Keukelaere et al.
(2009) found that custom warning messages that received as input the user’s experience
were more effective. Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón (2007) found that polymorphic
warnings help to mitigate unjustified risk. This relates to this study since a countdown or
count-up timer in a warning dialog is a form of polymorphic dialog. The findings in these
studies suggest that this study may have been successful in achieving its goal.
Most of the studies included in this section used a closed-lab experimental design
(Anderson et al., 2016; Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007; De Keukelaere et al.,
2009; Egelman et al., 2008) and one was a longitudinal study (Vance et al., 2018). The
closed-lab studies asked the participants to interact with a polymorphic dialog in some
way. The longitudinal study used an fMRI to examine the effectiveness of polymorphic
dialogs over the course of three weeks.
A variety of instruments were used. Two of the studies used an fMRI (Anderson et
al., 2016; Vance et al., 2018) as a way of gathering data, one study used customdeveloped software (De Keukelaere et al., 2009), and two of the studies used browser
warnings that already existed before the study (Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007;
Egelman et al., 2008). Anderson et al. (2016) designed a study in the background color of
a warning dialog was randomly changed. They used an fMRI and showed that participant
brain activity was greater when viewing polymorphic dialogs than when viewing static
dialogs. Egelman et al. (2008) found that the active warnings that were placed in the
user’s workflow were more effective than passive warnings.
Overall, the implications were that polymorphic dialogs are more effective than static
dialogs so that future systems should use dialogs that change in some way (Anderson et
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al., 2016; Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007; De Keukelaere et al., 2009; Egelman
et al., 2008; Vance et al., 2018). De Keukelaere et al. (2009) stated as future work to
create a longitudinal study to investigate the long-term effects on custom messaging that
takes the user’s previous actions as input. Anderson et al. (2016) suggested as future
work to use field methodologies to increase external validity. This relates to this study
which was a field methodology. Vance et al. (2018) suggested that future researchers
could investigate factors that may lead to the ineffectiveness of security indicators. This
relates to this study because it may be that heuristics lead to the ineffectiveness security
indicators and a goal of this study was to move users out of a heuristic mindset. The
studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6
Summary of Phishing Mitigation: Polymorphic Dialogs Literature

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Anderson et al.,
2016

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

25 University
Community
Members

fMRI

Polymorphic Warnings are
more effective than standard
warnings

13 University
Community
Members

Warning
Scenario &
Justified and
Unjustified
Risks
Accepted

Polymorphic Warnings with
and without sound reduce
frequency of unjustified risks
Participants who received
adaptive warnings opened
fewer attachments than
participants who received static
warnings

Brustoloni &
VillamarínSalomón, 2007

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

De Keukelaere et
al., 2014

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

32 Participants

Prototype
Web-Mail
Client &
Questionnaire

Egelman et al.,
2008

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

60 Participants
from General
Population;

Interaction
with Browser
Warning &
Exit Survey

Active warning more effective
than passive warning

Vance et al., 2018

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

16 Participants
from Large
University

fMRI

Mapped how habituation of
attention to security warnings
maps to actual behavior
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Training
There is disagreement regarding whether anti-phishing training is effective. Bax et al.
(2021), Burns et al. (2019), Caputo et al. (2013), Goel and Jain (2018), Gordon, Wright,
Glynn, et al. (2019), and Junger et al. (2017) found anti-phishing training to be largely
ineffective. Alnajim and Munro (2009), Baslyman and Chiasson (2016), Chatchalermpun
and Daengsi (2021), Jenkins and Durcikova (2013), Kumaraguru (2009), Sun et al.
(2017), and Volkamer et al. (2018) found anti-phishing training to be largely effective.
This disagreement suggests that anti-phishing training as it is implemented today may not
be effective, but that a solution that uses components of anti-phishing training may be
useful. Dhamija et al. (2006) stated that training is necessary, but that many users do not
use the right cues to detect phishing. One of the goals of this study was to train users to
pause and think, which could be considered an aspect of current anti-phishing training but
does not use anti-phishing training itself in its current form. Miranda (2018) stated that a
phishing training program can help to mitigate risk of phishing. He also stated that
training should be repeated periodically and gave a framework for e-mail-based antiphishing training. Bax et al. (2021) used a survey instrument and found that when users
respond to a perceived reward that users exhibit maladaptive behavior.
Baslyman and Chiasson (2016) classified anti-phishing training into three categories:
online training tutorials, embedded training systems, and educational games. Online
training tutorials are tutorials that are offered out of context, whereas embedded training
systems are offered in context immediately after the user falls to a phishing attack.
Educational games can take the form of an online game (Sun et al., 2017) or a physical
board game (Baslyman & Chiasson, 2016).
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Gordon, Wright, Glynn, et al. (2019) found that a mandatory online training tutorial
was less effective than an embedded training system. They found that the immediate
training had more impact than the online training tutorial. In addition, mandatory training
did not decrease the click rate on phishing emails. Gordon, Wright, Glynn, et al. (2019)
suggested that future work could expand to more organizations and gather employee role
demographics. Jenkins and Durcikova (2013) also compared an online training tutorial
with an embedded system (which they called a just-in-time reminder) and recommended
a combination of both trainings. They stated that an online training tutorial will help to
change attitudes and beliefs in users, but that changing attitudes and beliefs is not enough.
Chatchalermpun and Daengsi (2021) ran a phishing simulation, and then sent an email
explaining the simulated phish to all users who were victims of that phish. They ran
another simulation and found that response to the simulated phish decreased by 16%.
Users still need to be reminded, so that an embedded system is necessarily as well. They
also stated that an embedded-only system is not sufficient because users will ignore a
just-in-time reminder if they have the wrong attitude or belief. Jenkins and Durcikova
(2013) suggested as future work to measure objective security behavior. Harrison et al.
(2019) compared three types of training and found that mindfulness-based training was
more effective than rules-based training. Jensen et al. (2017) also found mindfulnessbased training more effective than rules-based training. This finding is relevant to this
study since the goal of the study was to produce a kind of mindfulness in the user.
Several studies investigated embedded training (Alnajim & Munro, 2009; Burns et
al., 2019; Caputo et al., 2013; Jensen et al., 2017; Kumaraguru, 2009; Nguyen et al.,
2021; Volkamer et al., 2018; Wash & Cooper, 2018). Only some of these studies found
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embedded training to be useful. Caputo et al. (2013) found training to be ineffective
because it was ignored. Others did find embedded training to be useful. Kumaraguru
(2009) found that participants made significantly better decisions after training and that
the participants retained the training for at least seven days. They introduced an
embedded training system called PhishGuru and studied embedded training by comparing
the effects of an all-text security notice, a notice with a graphics/text combination, and a
notice in the form of a comic strip. They found that the all-text security notices were the
least effective, and the comic strip notice was the most effective, although some
participants felt that the comic-strip notice was too childlike. Kumaraguru (2009)
suggested that future researchers apply embedded training in other scenarios and test
other mediums of training. Alnajim and Munro (2009) found that embedded alerts were
more effective than the anti-phishing emails. Alnajim and Munro (2009) proposed an
anti-phishing approach which compared online training in the form of anti-phishing email
tips with embedded training in a web browser. Nguyen et al. (2021) used crowdsourcing
to provide a safety report for emails received. Crowdsourcing refers to a method in which
a task is performed by a large, unidentified group of people (Nguyen et al., 2021). They
found that providing a crowdsourced report reduced anxiety and encouraged warning
acceptance in users. They found that individuals who used the crowdsourced report had
significantly higher message judgement accuracy.
A few studies used an experimental simulation study that used a phishing campaign
to study embedded training (Burns et al., 2019; Caputo et al., 2013; Wash & Cooper,
2018). Burns et al. (2019) found that post-event training with an individual loss message
was most effective and suggested that future researchers investigate with multiple rounds
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of framed training. Caputo et al. (2013) found that the difference in the framing types was
not statistically significant and explained the lack of significance by stating that many of
the participants ignored the training. Caputo et al. (2013) suggested that their study be
replicated while somehow compelling the participants to read the training. Wash and
Cooper (2018) found that anti-phishing advice was more likely to be followed when it
appears to come from an expert. Jensen et al. (2017) compared rule-based embedded
training with a mindfulness approach. They found that the mindfulness training resulted
in less susceptibility to phishing attacks than rule-based training and recommended
combining the two types of training in future studies. Jensen et al. (2017) suggested that
mindfulness may be a useful tool in other information technology fields.
Junger et al. (2017) and Volkamer et al. (2018) investigated the effects of training that
were not online. Junger et al. (2017) distributed paper flyers on phishing. Before and after
distributing the flyers, they asked the participants for private information, namely their
partial bank account number. They noted that the flyer did not make a statistically
significant difference in the percentage of participants who disclosed information and
stated that the participants did not connect the flyer with the request for private
information. Volkamer et al. (2018) investigated video-based training and found that
participants did significantly better both immediately after watching the video and eight
weeks later.
Several studies investigated training through gaming (Hale et al., 2015; Sheng et al.,
2007; Sun et al., 2017; Weanquoi et al., 2018; Wen et al., 2019). Most of the studies
creates an electronic game (Baslyman & Chiasson, 2016; Hale et al., 2015; Sheng et al.,
2007; Sun et al., 2017; Weanquoi et al., 2018; Wen et al., 2019). All studies reported a
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better understanding of anti-phishing techniques after the game was played. Sheng et al.
(2007) found no significant difference among the gender or age demographics. Sheng et
al. (2007) created Anti-Phishing Phil, which was designed to teach users how to identify
phishing URLs, where to look for cues for trustworthy or untrustworthy sites in web
browsers, and how to use search engines to find legitimate sites. They used learning
science principles and recommended that future studies use these principles as well. Wen
et al. (2019) created a game called What.Hack and compared it to Anti-Phishing Phil.
They found that their game was more effective and engaging than Anti-Phishing Phil.
Hale et al. (2015) created a web simulation platform called CyberPhishing.
CyberPhishing simulates an e-mail inbox, which is relevant to this study which was
designed to also simulate an e-mail inbox. Links and attachments in the CyberPhishing
simulation work as they would in a real situation, and this study also designed links and
attachments to work as they would in a real situation. Hale et al. (2015) found that a
majority of participants were able to correctly identify a phish while playing the game.
Sun et al. (2017) created a game for children in which the players complete a game-based
challenge and then a learning task. The participants could not continue to the learning
task until they completed the game-based challenge. Sun et al. (2017) found that learners
tended to learn from their mistakes. Weanquoi et al. (2018) created a game called A
Bird’s Life in which the player is a bird and must choose good worms over bad worms.
The bad worms represented phishes. They found that the game had a positive impact on
students’ learning about phishing attacks. Their stated future work was to continuously
improve the game based on player feedback.
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Baslyman and Chiasson (2016) created a board game, which they validated with an
expert panel of three SMEs. The participants participated in pre-test interviews, played
the game, and then completed a questionnaire which used a five-point Likert scale. Since
the pre-test and post-test were the same questions, validity of results comes into question
since the participants may have answered how they believed the researchers wanted them
to answer. Baslyman and Chiasson (2016) found that after playing the game, participants
had better understanding of phishing scams and learnt how to better protect themselves.
Baslyman and Chiasson (2016) intend to simplify game instructions and to expand the
game for future studies.
Stated implications included that organizations are susceptible to spear phishing
(Burns et al., 2019) and that text-based training is not sufficient to teach anti-phishing
techniques (Kumaraguru, 2009). Jenkins and Durcikova (2013) stated that behavior and
intention may not be enough to mitigate information disclosure. Caputo et al. (2013)
stated that a way must be found to convince users to read training.
Many studies related to phishing training recruited university community members as
participants (Dhamija et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2019; Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013;
Jensen et al., 2017; Sheng et al., 2007; Wash & Cooper, 2018; Weanquoi et al., 2018;
Wen et al., 2019) and some recruited corporate employees (Anderson et al., 2015; Burns
et al., 2019; Caputo et al., 2013; Gordon, Wright, Glynn, et al., 2019; Kumaraguru,
2009). Junger et al. (2017) recruited visitors to a shopping mall. Three studies recruited
participants according to personal attributes rather than physical location (Alnajim &
Munro, 2009; Baslyman & Chiasson, 2016; Sun et al., 2017). Sun et al. (2017) recruited
children aged between nine and 12. Alnajim and Munro (2009) recruited participants
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with no phishing awareness, and Baslyman and Chiasson (2016) recruited some computer
science experts as part of their sample population (four out of 21 participants). The
studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7
Summary of Phishing Mitigation: Phishing Training Literature

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

36
Participants
with No
Phishing
Awareness

Embedded
Alert in Web
Browser &
Pre-Test
Questionnaire

Post-event training more
effective than sending antiphishing tips by email

Baslyman &
Chiasson, 2016

Empirical &
Closed-Lab

21
Participants,
4 were
Computer
Science
Experts

Board Game &
Questionnaire

After playing the game,
participants had better
understanding of phishing scams
and learnt how to better protect
themselves

Bax, et al., 2021

Empirical

616
Participants

Questionnaire

Rewards influence maladaptive
behavior in response to email
phishing threats

Burns et al.,
2019

Empirical &
Simulation

260
Employees
from Single
Organization

Phishing
Campaign

Post-event training with
individual loss message most
effective

Empirical &
Simulation

1359
Employees
from a
MediumSized DCBased
Industrial
Organization

Phishing
Campaign

Training is not effective because
it was ignored; Framing did not
make a statistically significant
difference

Study

Alnajim &
Munro, 2009

Caputo et al.,
2013
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Table 7
Summary of Phishing Mitigation: Phishing Training Literature – (continued)

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Chatchalermpun
& Daengsi,
2021

Case Study

20,300
Workers

Simulation

Training is effective in
mitigating phishing

Dhamija et al.,
2006

Empirical

22 University
Community
Members

Web Site

Many users do not use the right
cues to detect phishing

Gordon et al.
2019

Empirical &
Simulation

6416
Employees at
1 TertiaryCare Medical
Center

Phishing
Campaign

Immediate training had more
impact than online course;
Mandatory training did not
decrease click rate

Hale et al., 2015

Empirical

14 Participants

CyberPhishing
Game
Platform

Created a web simulation
platform called CyberPhishing

Harrison et al.,
2019

Empirical

422 University
Community
Members

Three
Different
Types of AntiPhishing
Training

Mindfulness-based training was
significantly better than rulesbased training for improving
phishing detection rate

Jenkins &
Durcikova,
2013

Empirical &
Simulation

194 Students

Online
Simulation

Attitude influenced intention, but
intention did not mitigate
information disclosure

Empirical &
Simulation

355 Faculty,
Staff, and
Students at a
Midwestern
University

ComputerBased
Training
Programs and
Simulated
Phishing
Campaign

Mindfulness training resulted in
less susceptibility than rulebased training

Survey

278 Visitors at
a Shopping
Mall

Training
Leaflet &
Questionnaire

Priming/brief training didn’t
help; participants did not make
connection between leaflet and
questions

Empirical &
Simulation

311 employees
of Large
Portuguese
Company

Embedded
Training
System:
PhishGuru

Participants in training made
significantly better decisions
after training; Knowledge
retained for at least 7 days;
Difference in training type not
significant

Jensen et al.,
2017

Junger et al.,
2017

Kumaraguru,
2009
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Table 7
Summary of Phishing Mitigation: Phishing Training Literature – (continued)
Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Literature
Review and
Synthesis

Phishing
Training Best
Practices

Outlined structure for emailbased phishing training

Nguyen et al.,
2021

Empirical

438 Students

Simulation of
Crowdsourced
Warning
System

Individuals had significantly
higher message judgement
accuracy

Sheng et al.,
2007

Empirical

42 University
Community
Members

Anti-Phishing
Phil

Anti-phishing game helped
players to identify phishing

Study

Methodology

Miranda, 2018

Sample

Timers
Few studies were found regarding social engineering that employed timers. Molinaro
(2019) used a countdown timer during which her participants were asked to distinguish
phishing e-mails from valid e-mails, but the timer was not the focus of her study.
However, work related to timers in other research fields have been conducted. The
sections below provide information about research from other fields related to timers.
Healthcare
In the field of healthcare, the research showed that timers are used to remind workers
of a task or of a medical emergency. Three studies incorporated a mobile app including
for an Android tablet (Lindahl et al., 2019; Uddin et al., 2017) and for a smartphone
(Hung et al., 2020). Marto et al. (2016) found that introducing a countdown timer with a
reminder that stroke is an emergency to an emergency stroke patient’s room decreased
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the time between when the patient arrived in the emergency room and the time the patient
received a drug that is able to dissolve a clot. Lindahl et al. (2019) created an Android
tablet app that allows patients to self-administer a blood-pressure test. In the app, the
timer reminded the patient to sit still for five minutes. Lindahl et al. (2019) reported that
99% of 100 pregnant women followed the timer guidance and were able to complete the
blood-pressure test. Uddin et al. (2017) created an Android tablet app to reduce Operating
Room (OR) turnover time. Uddin et al. (2017) presented a timer in the OR with
successive green then yellow then red as the timer counted down. If the timer expired, the
user was asked to indicate why there was a delay. Uddin et al. (2017) reported that the
countdown timer was effective in reducing OR turnover time and reported as future
research to place the system in the gastrointestinal lab as well.
Hung et al. (2020) created a smartphone app to guide hospital cleaning staff in the
cleaning of patient beds. The app alerted staff to which beds needed to be cleaned and
provided a countdown timer to indicate the deadline for cleaning the bed. Hung et al.
(2020) stated that there was a significant decrease in time required for cleaning beds
when the app was in use. The studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table 8.
Table 8
Summary of Timers: Healthcare Literature

Study

Hung et al.,
2020

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Experimental

Hospital BedCleaning Staff

App for BedCleaning
Management &
Questionnaire

Significant decrease in time to
clean a bed
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Table 8
Summary of Timers: Healthcare Literature – (continued)

Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Majority of participants were
able to take accurate blood
pressure readings

Lindahl et al.,
2019

Experimental

100 Pregnant
Women

Tablet App for
Blood Pressure
selfMeasurement &
Questionnaire

Marto et al.,
2016

Experimental

Stroke
Patients

Timer in ER

Time to treat was reduced with
the presence of the timer

232 OR Cases

An Android
Tablet App
Designed to
Reduce OR
Turnover Time

Countdown timer found to be
effective

Uddin et al.,
2017

Experimental

Civil Engineering
The civil engineering literature regarding timers investigated Pedestrian Countdown
Signals (PCS) at intersections. Researchers from different parts of the world have
investigated PCS, including India (Biswas et al., 2017), Canada (Rothman et al., 2019),
Ireland (Keegan & O’Mahony, 2003), China (Tang et al., 2020), and the US (Kitali et al.,
2018). A PCS is a countdown timer that indicates to a pedestrian waiting to cross a road
at an intersection when it is safe to cross (Keegan & O’Mahony, 2003). Many of the
studies were cross-sectional (Biswas et al., 2017; Rothman et al., 2019), and one was a
survey (Keegan & O’Mahony, 2003). Biswas et al. (2017) studied the effect PCS and
Driver Countdown Signals (DCS) had on the interaction between drivers and pedestrians.
They found that the number of drivers that drove through a red light increased when a
DCS was present, and that as the DCS neared zero, drivers moved into the crosswalks,
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blocking pedestrian movement. They concluded that PCS and DCS have an overall
positive effect on traffic flow but an overall negative effect on pedestrian safety. In
contrast, Keegan and O’Mahony (2003) reported findings that pedestrian safety increased
because PCS decreased the number of pedestrians that crossed the road during a do not
walk signal. They also reported that pedestrians often overestimate the time required to
cross, stating that pedestrians would start to cross when there wasn’t enough time left on
the PCS. Keegan and O’Mahony (2003) stated that, because their study showed promise
for the positive influence of PCSs, PCSs were being introduced to more of the Dublin
area. Kitali et al. (2018) used a before-after study with the empirical Bayes method to
analyze secondary data. They found that drivers used PCS as cues and that PCS improved
driver safety. Rothman et al. (2019) also used secondary data to study the effects of PCS
on pedestrian-motor-vehicle collisions. They found that the effects of PCS on pedestrianmotor-vehicle collisions varied based on age and location. Tang et al. (2020) studied the
effect of PCSs on the behavior of electric bike users. They found that there were more
near-violations at intersections with timers. The studies discussed in this section are
summarized in Table 9.
Table 9
Summary of Timers: Civil Engineering Literature

Study
Biswas et al.,
2017

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Experimental

Pedestrians in
Crosswalks at
Signaled
Intersections

Driver and
Pedestrian
Countdown
Timers

As driver countdown timer
ended, drivers moved into
crosswalks
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Table 9
Summary of Timers: Civil Engineering Literature – (continued)

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Keegan &
O’Mahony,
2003

Experimental

Pedestrians in
Crosswalks at
Signaled
Intersections

PCS &
Questionnaire

PCS reduce number of
pedestrians that cross during
don't walk signal

Kitali et al.,
2018

Correlational

Drivers at
Signaled
Intersections

PCS &
Secondary
Data

PCS significantly improve
driver safety

Rothman et al.,
2019

Correlational

14,911
Pedestrian
Motor Vehicle
Collisions
(PMVC)

PCS &
Secondary
Data

The effects of PCS on PMVC
may vary by age and location

Tang et al.,
2020

Empirical

3,128 Electric
Bike Users

Observation

More near-violations at
intersections with timers

Study

Psychology
Many areas of psychology have been represented by studies that include timers
including somnology (Lo et al., 2019), urgent decision making (Barque-Duran et al.,
2017; Cheong, 2018), standardized testing (Brooks et al., 2003), child psychology
(Newquist et al., 2012), and remote team communication (Fine, 2016). Fine (2016) found
that a common timer between two remote team members increased performance. Cheong
(2018) found that a timer increased urgent decision making skill regarding whether to
evacuate a home in danger of fire as long as the psychological pressure from the timer
was not too high. Barque-Duran et al. (2017) presented their participants with a simulated
moral dilemma and found that a timer resulted in a more utilitarian choice, especially on
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a smartphone versus a Personal Computer (PC). In contrast, Newquist et al. (2012) found
that a timer did not help children make a decision requiring more self-control, and Brooks
et al. (2003) found a non-significant difference between the scores of timed and untimed
standardized test-takers. Lo et al. (2019) used a count-up timer to measure participant
vigilance in a sleep study. The studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table
10.
Table 10
Summary of Timers: Psychology Literature

Study

Barque-Duran
et al., 2017

Brooks et al.,
2003

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Experimental

250 Amazon
MTurk
Workers

Simulated
Trolley
Problem &
Questionnaire

Time pressure resulted in a
more utilitarian choice

Experimental

360,000
Students

Standardized
Test

Small improvement for untimed
students before grade 6, small
improvement for timed students
after grade 6
Time pressure increased
performance as long as the
pressure wasn’t too high

Cheong, 2018

Experimental

300 Subjects

Map-Based
Representations
&
Questionnaire

Fine, 2016

Experimental

8 Groups of 2
Students

Bomb
Diffusion
Game

Common timer aided task
performance

Lo et al., 2019

Experimental

Adolescents
Aged 15-19

Polysomnography

Adolescents with split sleep
schedule were less impaired
than adolescents with
continuous sleep

Newquist et al.,
2012

Experimental

3 Children
from Ages 3
to 5

Edibles & Toys

The timer was not effective for
enhancing self-control
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Text Color
There appears that very limited research exists that investigated the effect of text
color in phishing warning notices. Anderson et al. (2015) investigated the effect of color
warning images versus greyscale warning images, and other studies investigated text
color, but not in the cybersecurity field (Bazilinskyy et al., 2019; Grummon et al., 2019;
Mehta et al., 2017; Silver et al., 2002; Wogalter et al., 2002). Bazilinskyy et al. (2019)
studied the effect of text color on electronic warning notices on the front bumper of
automated cars to warn pedestrians at an intersection because the driver of the car may
not be paying attention. Grummon et al. (2019) investigated the effect of color on highsugar warning notices on products such as cola. Mehta et al. (2017) studied the effect of
color of a chat wait dialog on the number of prank chats to a child help line. Silver et al.
(2002) studied the effect of color on a warning label on crayons and on muriatic acid.
There are inconsistencies with regard to the effect of text color on the hazard
perception of a warning. Wogalter et al. (2002) stated that red has been found to increase
the hazard rating of a warning, and that colored labels, especially red, are more noticeable
than grey. Grummon et al. (2019) found a that warning notice with white text on a red
background to be the most effective, but Mehta et al. (2017) found that those who have
higher attention-seeking behavior tended to disregard red warnings and Anderson et al.
(2015) found that participants did not make better decisions when presented with a red
warning image vs a grey warning image. Bazilinskyy et al. (2019) found that color itself
did not significantly affect pedestrian action, but that it acted as a reinforcer to the text
message on pedestrian action. Silver et al. (2002) stated that the colors that communicate
hazard from highest to lowest perception are black, blue, red, and orange. They
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acknowledged that black as the highest perceived hazard warning color contradicts others
who found that red is the highest perceived warning color and offered the explanation
that darker colors are perceived as more hazardous.
All of the studies reviewed used some kind of simulation in which the participants
saw a variety of colored or greyscale messages. In three different studies, Mehta et al.
(2017) showed messages in red, blue, or white and found that, while red messaging
seemed to have the opposite desired effect of warning, blue and white did not show a
statistically significant difference in user reaction. Anderson et al. (2015) compared red to
greyscale warnings by displaying the warnings to the participants and using an EEG to
measure the participants’ reaction to the warnings. They found no difference in decisionmaking ability when the red vs greyscale warnings were shown. Anderson et al. (2015)
acknowledged that the finding of no difference between greyscale and colored warnings
contradicted past studies and recommended further studies in other colors such as blue.
Mehta et al. (2017) also recommended that future studies compare warnings in blue
versus white and also that the effect of the color red on compliance be investigated
further in other settings. Nadeem and Junger (2019) chose blue for the warning notice to
laptop users not to leave laptops unattended because it is a "warm, communicative, and a
peaceful color" (p. 13). The studies discussed in this section are summarized in Table 11.
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Table 11
Summary of Text Color Literature

Methodology

Sample

Instrument/
Constructs

Main Findings or Contribution

Experimental

61 Volunteers
from Large
Private
University

Browser
Warnings &
EEG

Found no difference in P300
readings when viewing red vs
grayscale

Experimental

1319
Participants
from 75
Countries

Photo of Car
with Colored
Text Message
&
Questionnaire

Text message more persuasive
than color; color acted as
reinforcer

Grummon et
al., 2019

Experimental

1413 US
Adult MTurk
Workers

High Sugar
Food Warning
Labels on Cola
&
Questionnaire

Warning with white text and
red background most effective

Mehta et al.,
2017

Experimental

4152 Users

Child Helpline
Chat Wait
Screen

Red can lead to non-compliant
behavior

Nadeem &
Junger, 2019

Experimental

22 Laptop
Owners

Warning Sign
in a Study Hall

Significant reduction in laptops
left in the presence of a
warning sign

Silver et al.,
2002

Experimental

124
Undergraduat
e Students

Warning Labels
&
Questionnaire

Black, blue, red, and orange
were perceived as highest to
lowest hazard, respectively

Wogalter et
al., 2002

Empirical

Commentary

Warnings

Guidelines for warning design

Study
Anderson et
al., 2015

Bazilinskyy et
al., 2019

Summary of What is Known and Unknown in Literature
It is known that social engineering is one of the most under researched and most
effective cybercrimes (Jain et al., 2016) and that technical solutions to social engineering
don’t typically work (Krombholz et al., 2015). There are many different types of phishing
attacks (Salahdine & Kaabouch, 2019). Phishing still persists because users are baited
with fear or excitement (Goel et al., 2017). The phishing techniques are dynamic and so
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that no solution works in the long-term. The best way to counteract phishing is unknown
(Krombholz et al., 2015).
It is known that humans use heuristics to make quick, instinctual decisions
(Kahneman, 2011) and that sometimes the use of heuristics can lead to misjudgments
(Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011; Gerlach et al., 2019). Measuring heuristics is difficult (Arazy et
al., 2017). Habituation occurs when users are exposed to the same warning dialog
repeatedly which leads users to move to a heuristic thought process (Anderson et al.,
2014b; Kim & Wogalter, 2009). Requiring user interaction reduces habituation (Harbach
et al., 2014; Karegar et al., 2020).
Phishing is more effective on a mobile device, at least partially because of the smaller
screen (Amro, 2018; Goel & Jain, 2018), but it is unknown how to stop phishing attacks
on a mobile device, including how to stop a zero-day attack (Chorghe & Shekokar,
2016). Polymorphic dialogs help to reduce habituation (Anderson et al., 2016; Brustoloni
& Villamarín-Salomón, 2007) and that polymorphic dialogs are more effective than static
dialogs (Anderson et al., 2016; Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007; De Keukelaere
et al., 2009; Egelman et al., 2008; Vance et al., 2018). It is unknown what the long-term
effect of polymorphic dialogs is (De Keukelaere et al., 2009) or whether anti-phishing
training is effective.
It is unknown how effective timers are in phishing mitigation techniques although it
is known that timers are effective in many cases in healthcare (Hung et al., 2020; Marto
et al., 2016; Uddin et al., 2017), civil engineering (Biswas et al., 2017; Rothman et al.,
2019), and psychology (Fine, 2016) in moving a person into a logical thought process. It
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is unknown how widely effective timers are in these fields since some studies found
timers to be ineffective (Brooks et al., 2003; Newquist et al., 2012).
It is also unknown what effect text color has when used in cybersecurity warnings
although it is known that color is more effective than greyscale (Anderson et al., 2015).
There is disagreement regarding how effective the color red is in indicating a hazard. It is
unknown what effect blue has when used as a text color in hazard warnings.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of Research Design
This research was conducted in three phases as shown in Figure 1. It was
hypothesized that PAT would help users to detect phishing by displaying a warning
dialog in colored text and with a timer to move them into a more logical thought process.
This research design was defined as an experimental field study design. A quantitative
approach was used to collect SMEs opinion on the value for the countdown or count-up
timer in the warning dialog and on the validity of the sample e-mails, all of which were
part of Phase I. PAT was designed and developed during Phase II. A quantitative survey
was used to collect SMEs feedback on the functional correctness of PAT. Phase III used a
quantitative approach to collect data from participants who used the app.
In Phase I, a quantitative survey was used to collect opinion data from approximately
25 SMEs on which timer value should be used in the countdown and count-up timer and
on the validity of the sample e-mails and on the experimental procedures of PAT.
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Figure 1
Overview of Research Design Process
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Phase II was a developmental stage in which the mobile app was created and tested by a
pilot group of participants. Phase III was the experimental study in which approximately
100 participants used the mobile app to check simulated e-mail as well as interact with
simulated phishes and the countdown and count-up timer warning dialog.
A mobile app was created to test the ability of users to avoid phishes when presented
with a countdown or count-up timer and colored warning text. The goal of the app was to
assist users in overcoming the instinctual reaction that is the hallmark of System One.
The app simulated a Gmail inbox and presented a timer when the user was presented with
a simulated email that has either a link or an attachment.
The independent variables were the timer type (countdown, count-up, or no timer),
the timer value (the three values of which were determined in Phase I), and the text color
(grey, red, or black). The dependent variable was the number of times a malicious URL
or attachment was clicked. The demographic factors were moderating variables.
Phase I
Phase I used a quantitative survey to collect opinions from SMEs. The purpose of the
survey was to collect timer values, validate sample emails, and validate the experimental
procedures of PAT. The survey had four sections. The first section was a demographic
questionnaire to document the expertise of the SMEs. The beginning of the SME
demographic survey can be found in Appendix A. The second section provided a mockup
of what the timer looks like in the custom app so that the SMEs could visualize the
countdown or count-up timer and then asked what the timer value should be. The SMEs
were asked to rank the timer values given.
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It was necessary to choose valid timer values to increase the validity of the entire
study. The third section asked the SMEs to rate thirty sample emails individually. For
each sample email, the SMEs were asked to identify the email as phishing or legitimate
and whether the email should be kept, adjusted, or replaced. If the SMEs chose the option
to adjust or replace, they were asked to specify how (in the case of adjust), or why (in the
case of replace). The SMEs were also asked for additional feedback. An example of a
sample email question from the SME survey is shown in Appendix B.
The survey was distributed via Google Forms and used the Delphi method (Ramim &
Lichvar, 2014) for section two to narrow the timer values to three values. For the second
round, the survey was shortened to include only section two. Prior research has utilized
the Delphi method to gain a consensus in cybersecurity (Carlton, 2016; Ramim &
Lichvar, 2014). The Delphi method uses an iterative feedback loop in which feedback
from the last iteration is used to inform the next iteration until a consensus is reached.
Kendall’s W values are used to assess agreement among raters (Schmidt, 1997). Schmidt
(1997) recommended a threshold of .5 for Kendall’s W values, so this threshold was
adopted to determine the timer value to be used in the countdown or count-up timer.
Figure 2 through Figure 4 show sections one and two of an example SME survey. Figure
2 shows what the timer dialog looked like which displayed after the introduction section
in the SMEs survey. Figure 3 shows the questions in the demographic portion of the
SMEs survey, and Figure 4 shows the timer question from the SMEs survey that asked
the SMEs to rank the possible timer values. Each SME received an email invitation
(Appendix C) to participate in the survey. The results of this survey were used to answer
RQ1 and RQ2.
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Figure 2
Example of PAT Timer Dialog
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Figure 3
Example of SMEs Demographic Questions

Figure 4
Example of SMEs Timer Ranking Question
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Phase II
Phase II entailed the design, development, and testing of PAT. PAT was created
twice, once for Android devices and once for Apple devices. PAT simulates a basic
Gmail client that allows the user to check their e-mail. PAT includes a demographic
survey that is displayed the first time the app is opened. The demographic survey is
embedded in the app. The results from the survey were stored with no PII in a
spreadsheet document on the app back-end. When the participant interacted with a
simulated e-mail that has a URL or an attachment, the id of that email and whether the
user clicked on the URL or the attachment were stored with no PII in a spreadsheet
document on the app back-end. The user was assigned a User Identification Number
(UIN). A warning and a timer as shown in Figure 2 displayed each time the user
receiving the treatment opened a simulated e-mail that contained a URL or attachment.
The user was not able to bypass the timer and had to wait until the timer was expired
before interacting with the simulated e-mail. Each time the user interacted with a
simulated e-mail for which a timer displayed, the id of that e-mail and if the user clicked
on the URL was stored.
Phase III
In phase III, approximately 110 participants, who were recruited via Facebook and
LinkedIn, were asked to interact with PAT. An example of the recruitment post is in
Appendix D, and an example of the participant invitation letter is in Appendix E. Because
of a limitation in the PAT app back-end, which is discussed in the limitation section,
recruitment happened in phases. First 10 participants were recruited for the pilot study
such that Apple and Android users were equally represented. The pilot group was used to
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verify the mobile app and data collection. Use of the app was observed, the countdown
and count-up timers were manually timed, and data collection was verified. Then 50
participants were recruited for the control group. It was not disclosed to the participants
that they were in the control group. When the control group had finished participation,
then 50 more participants were recruited for the experimental group.
The participants were asked for feedback regarding the app. The Delphi method was
used. The findings and recommendations of the participants in the pilot study were
incorporated into the app and the process repeated for a second iteration.
Yan et al. (2015) studied user behavior for one week. Since this study was also
analyzing user behavior, participants were asked to use PAT for seven days. Alert Logic
(2018) stated that the average user receives 16 malicious emails per month. For this
study, simulated emails were randomly assigned to all participants from a pool of all
emails stored in the back-end. The pool contained 10 legitimate text-only emails, and five
each of the following: legitimate with a link, legitimate with an attachment, phishing with
a link, and phishing with an attachment. Each participant received the same simulated
emails each day, and each participant received five simulated emails per day. A summary
of the types of simulated email that were used is summarized in Table 12.
Table 12
Summary of Simulated Email Types
Email types

Link

Attachment

Legitimate text-only
Legitimate link
Legitimate attachment
Phishing link
Phishing attachment

No
Yes
No
Yes
No

No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Number of Emails in
the Sample
10
5
5
5
5
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PAT collected and stored non-PII data from the participants. When participants
downloaded PAT, they were given a UIN that was used to link their data to their profile.
The participants were asked to take a short survey, which included demographic
questions. Participant age, gender, education level, attention span, and the
amount of email they receive were stored. The survey also asked whether the participant
is completely color-blind (National Eye Institute, 2019). Attention span was measured
with an attention span test adopted from Psychology Today (n.d.) which was embedded
in the app survey. The results of the demographic survey were used towards answering
RQ5a-b. An example of the participant demographic survey is shown in Appendix F. An
example of the attention span questions is in Appendix G.
After the participants finished the survey, the participants saw a simulated inbox
listing. Participants were able to interact with any e-mail in the simulated inbox as though
it were a real e-mail. The app had pre-coded simulated e-mails that displayed in a random
order. Some of the simulated e-mails mimicked a legitimate e-mail, and some simulated a
phish, and each simulated e-mail was identified by a unique email number (i.e., ID). New
e-mails displayed on each day of the study to simulate receiving new e-mail. Some
simulated e-mails had a URL or an attachment, and some did not. If a participant
receiving the timer treatment opened an e-mail that has a URL in the body of the message
or an attachment, a timer was displayed, and they were not able to interact with the e-mail
until the timer expired. When they did interact with the email, the data collected was: (1)
the unique email number of the simulated e-mail, and (2) if the participant clicked on the
link or attachment. The app also captured and stored whether a countdown, count-up, or
no timer was used, the value of the timer used, and whether grey, red, or black text was
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used. These data were used towards answering RQ3 through RQ5a-b. The data was
stored in a spreadsheet document on the app back-end. No PII was captured or stored. An
example of a simulated phishing email with no dialog is in Appendix H. An example of a
simulated phishing email with a warning but no timer is in Appendix I, and an example
of a phishing email with a warning and a timer is in Appendix J.
Instrument and Prototype Development
Instrument for Collecting SMEs Feedback Regarding Timer Value
So that a valid timer value could be used in Phases II and III of this research, SMEs
were asked in Phase I for a valid timer value using a Google Forms survey. The survey
asked the SMEs for demographic information to confirm their expertise, presented a
mockup of the timer, asked the SMEs to rank eight timer values. An example of the timer
ranking question is in Figure 4. The data was analyzed using Google Form’s data analysis
tools and Kendall’s W values. Kendall’s W values measure agreement among survey
participants using a least squares solution (Schmidt, 1997). The three values that have the
most agreement among the SMEs were used in Phases II and III.
Instrument for Collecting SMEs Feedback Regarding Sample E-Mails
A quantitative survey was developed to capture the SMEs’ feedback regarding what
simulated sample e-mails should be used in this study. SMEs were provided with a set of
legitimate e-mails and phishes and were asked whether to (1) “Keep”, (2) “Adjust”, or (3)
“Replace” each e-mail. If the SMEs proposed “Adjust” or “Replace”, they were asked in
to provide feedback on how to adjust or why to replace that e-mail.
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Instrument for Collecting Pilot Participant Feedback Regarding PAT
A quantitative survey was developed to capture the SMEs’ feedback that included a
step-by-step process of what users eventually saw. SMEs were provided with a set of
experimental protocols and be asked whether to (1) “Keep”, (2) “Adjust”, or (3)
“Replace” each step of the experiments. If the SMEs proposed “Adjust” or “Replace”,
they were asked to provide feedback on how to adjust or why to replace that step.
Instrument for Collecting Participant Demographic Information
In Phase III of this study, participants were presented with a demographic survey
when they opened the app for the first time. This survey asked participants for their age,
gender, education level, attention span, and the volume of email they received in a day.
The attention span questions were adopted from the attention span test on Psychology
Today (n.d.). The survey also asked whether the participant is completely color-blind
(National Eye Institute, 2019). If participants answered that they are completely colorblind, they were excluded from the study.
PAT Prototype Development
Using the data from the SMEs survey in Phase I, PAT, which simulates a Gmail
inbox, was developed. PAT has two versions, one for use on Apple devices, and one for
use on Android devices. PAT simulates a basic Gmail client and overlays a dialog when
the participant opens an email that contains a link or an attachment. The dialog requires
participants receiving the treatment to pause by including a countdown or count-up timer,
along with a grey or red warning. The experimental group was not able to dismiss the
warning dialog until the timer expired. The timer was set to one of three different values.
These three values were determined in Phase I of this study. The control group received a
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warning in black text with no timer and were able to access email immediately after
dismissing the warning dialog. For the control group, dismissing the warning dialog was
possible immediately after it appeared.
Requirements for this app were:
1. The first time a user opens PAT, the user is presented with a demographic survey
which the user needs to complete before continuing. PAT sends the survey
responses to a spreadsheet form in which no PII is collected or stored. Each
participant is assigned a UIN.
2. On the primary PAT screen, users are presented with simulated Gmail inbox.
Users are able to tap an email listing which opens that email. As the email opens,
one of two actions occurs:
a. If there is no URL or attachment in the email, the email opens and the user
is able to read it
b. If there is a URL or attachment in the email, a warning dialog appears
with different options for the following variables:
i.

Warning text color (grey, red, or black)

ii.

A countdown or count-up timer or no timer

iii.

In the cases of a countdown or count-up timer, a starting timer
value determined from Phase I

3. When the user interacts with either timer, the following data is collected and sent
to a spreadsheet form:
a. The color of the warning text
b. Whether a countdown or count-up timer or no timer was displayed
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c. In the case of a countdown or count-up timer, the starting value of the
timer
d. The unique email number of the simulated e-mail
e. Whether or not the user clicked on the URL
4. PAT does not provide any other functionality.
An overview of the PAT functionality is given in Figure 5.
Effectiveness of the PAT Prototype
The survey in Phase I provided a valid timer value for use in PAT. Phase II included
validation testing for PAT which included the functionality of the app and validation of
the correct collection of data. It was also confirmed that no PII is collected. In Phase III,
there was a pilot study so that any validation or functionality issues regarding PAT could
be identified.
This research followed an experimental field study research design which included
quantitative measures (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). An experimental field study design is
a valid methodology when conducting developmental research (Ivankova et al., 2006).
There were three data collection points in this research design. In Phase I, data were
collected from a quantitative expert panel survey which asked SMEs to rank timer values.
The Delphi method with Kendall’s W values was used to find a consensus among the
SMEs. Data was collected in Phase I from a quantitative expert panel regarding the
validity of the sample e-mails. By receiving SMEs feedback for the timer value and
sample e-mails, validity was increased. In Phase II, the sample e-mails were coded to
display in a random order.
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Figure 5
Overview of the PAT Process

The sample emails displayed in a random order increased validity since displaying emails in a random order reduced the probability that one particular e-mail influenced
participant reaction to another e-mail. The Delphi method was also used in Phase II until
the SMEs agreed that PAT was functionally sound, valid, and reliable. In Phase III,
quantitative data was collected from participants as they use PAT.
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Reliability and Validity
Reliability
Reliability is the measure of how consistent experimental results are as time passes
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). A study is considered reliable if the same input consistently
produces the same output (Ellis & Levy, 2009). Stability reliability refers to how an
instrument produces output over a period of time (Ellis & Levy, 2009; Sekaran & Bougie,
2016). PAT was tested for stability reliability using the Delphi method in Phase II.
Parallel-form reliability refers to when two sets of measures on the same instrument are
highly correlated (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). PAT was tested for parallel-form reliability
in Phase III since there was a pilot test.
Validity
Sekaran and Bougie (2016) stated that there are two kinds of validity–external and
internal. External validity refers to how confident the researchers are that results of their
study are generalizable to other settings, people, and events (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016).
Internal validity refers to how much confidence there is in an instrument that it measures
what it is intended to measure (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Since this research was a field
experiment, it was expected that the external validity would be high (Sekaran & Bougie,
2016). This study addressed internal validity by using the Delphi method with Kendall’s
W values to gain a consensus for a timer value in Phase I, by testing PAT functionality in
Phase II, and by running a pre-test in Phase III. External validity was addressed by the
simulation of an existing e-mail service and by asking the participants to check e-mail as
they normally would. Straub (1989) discussed the importance of instrument validation.
By testing the completeness and correctness of the mobile app designed and created for
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this study, the instrument validity of PAT was addressed. Threats to validity that may
have affected this study were testing effects and selection bias effects. Testing effects
refer to the participant’s awareness of being observed influencing their action (Sekaran &
Bougie, 2016). Since this study was a closed-lab experiment, participant knowledge that
this investigation was examining user actions when encountering a phish may have made
participants hyper-vigilant when using the app (Finn & Jakobsson, 2007). Participants
were asked to use the app as normally as they can and to imagine that they were checking
e-mail as they would normally. Selection bias effects refer to how participants are
selected for this study (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Since participants were chosen by
convenience sampling through Facebook and LinkedIn rather than by simple random
sampling, selection bias may have affected the results.
Sample
The sample was chosen by convenience sampling from LinkedIn and Facebook. A
targeted message with an invitation to participant was posted on Facebook and LinkedIn.
Users of these websites who are directly connected to the researcher were requested to
share the invitation through the website. Stokes et al. (2019) used Facebook and LinkedIn
to recruit nurses and received response rates of 25% and 5% respectively. While
LinkedIn had a significantly lower response rate, Stokes et al. (2019) found that the
socioeconomic differences between participants from LinkedIn and Facebook to be
significant. Therefore, both social media platforms were used in an attempt to receive
more variety in the sample.
Sekaran and Bougie (2016) stated that, for each sample that is broken into
subsamples, a minimum of 30 participants for each category is recommended. Given that
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the timer values Independent Variable (IV) has three categories, the target sample size
was 100 participants. Carlton (2016) invited 975 individuals and collected 245 responses
generating response rate of 25.1%. Ball (2012) surveyed 2380 individuals and collected
396 responses generating a response rate of 16%. Therefore, the anticipated response rate
was approximately 20% and at least 500 individuals were invited to participate in this
study.
Pre-analysis Data Screening
According to Mertler and Vannatta (2010), there are four primary reasons for
screening data: (1) data accuracy, (2) assessing incomplete data, (3) assessing extreme
values (outliers), and (4) assessing the relationship between the data and assumptions
made.
With regard to assessing incomplete data, all fields in the participant survey were
required, so there was no incomplete data. Any participants that indicated that they are
completely colorblind were excluded. In addition, PAT was checked for correctness, and
all participants received at least four phishing emails through the PAT through random
simulated email assignment. Mahalanobis Distance was used to determine which data are
outliers (Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). The data collected were screened using Mahalanobis
Distance to find outliers and the outliers were evaluated for removal from further
analysis.
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Data Analysis
In Phase I, an expert panel and the Delphi method with Kendall’s W values were used
to identify and validate the three separate levels to be used in the countdown and countup timers. This process was used to answer RQ1. In addition, the Delphi method was
used to assess the functional correctness and validity of PAT. A pilot study of 10
participants used the app. Any feedback that affected the function or validity of PAT was
fixed before the next cycle. This process was used to answer RQ2.
The data collected in Phase II were analyzed using factorial ANOVA and factorial
ANCOVA. Factorial ANOVA is used to test for significant differences between two or
more IVs as well as any significant interaction between those two IVs (Mertler &
Vannatta, 2010). Factorial ANOVA was used to answer RQ3 and RQ4. In RQ3, the IVs
were the text color and the timer value. In RQ4, the IVs were the timer type and the timer
value. The DV for both RQ3 and RQ4 were the number of times a malicious URL was
clicked.
While factorial ANOVA is used to study only the effect of the IVs on the DV,
factorial ANCOVA is used to study the effects of covariate variables that may affect the
relationship between the IVs and the DV (Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). These covariate
variables are often environmental or describe human characteristics. Therefore, factorial
ANCOVA was used to answer RQ5a-b, which considered the effect demographic
variables (age, gender, education level, attention span, and volume of email). A data
collection detail summary is in Appendix M. Table 13 summarizes the research phases.
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Table 13
Summary of Research Phases
Research Question

Phase

Sample

Methodology

Analysis

RQ1

Phase I

25 SMEs

Delphi

Consensus via
means and Kendall’s
W analysis

RQ2

Phase I

25 SMEs

Delphi

Consensus via
means and Kendall’s
W analysis

RQ3

Phase III

100 users

RQ4

Phase III

100 users

RQ5a-RQ5b

Phase III

100 users

Quantitative
survey
Quantitative
survey
Quantitative
survey

ANOVA
ANOVA
ANCOVA

Resources
Before this research study could begin, permission was obtained from Nova
Southeastern University’s Institutional Research Board (IRB). LinkedIn
(https://www.linkedin.com) was used to find SMEs willing to participant in Phase I of
this study. Google Forms (https://docs.google.com/forms/u/0/ ) was used to develop the
surveys for Phase I and for the participant demographic survey. The development of PAT
was conducted. In Phase III, the data that were collected by the mobile app were stored in
an Excel spreadsheet document which was downloaded from the app back-end.
Summary
The overall research methodology was presented in this chapter. An experimental
field study research design using quantitative measures was used to validate, test, collect,
and analyze research data. The goal of this research was to answer the following research
questions:
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The main research question that this study addressed was: Are there statistically
significant mean differences between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of
e-mail users who are not required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at
three separate timer values presented with a countdown or count-up timer with a red or
grey warning message?
RQ1: What are the three timer values to require the user to pause that should be
used in this experimental field study to assess users’ ability to identify
malicious links in e-mail according to cybersecurity SMEs?
RQ2: What level of functional correctness and validity of the custom-designed
mobile app is sufficient according cybersecurity SMEs?
RQ3: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black text?
RQ4: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer?
RQ5a: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black text based
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on the categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level, (d) the
volume of email the user receives in a day, and (e) attention span?
RQ5b: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer based on the categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level,
(d) the volume of email the user receives in a day, and (e) attention span?
The RQs were addressed over three phases. Phase I collected feedback from a SME
expert panel survey regarding the value to use in the countdown and count-up timer.
Phase II encompassed the design, development, and testing of PAT. Phase III was a field
study in which 100 participants used the app to simulate checking a Gmail account.
When the participants first opened the app, they were asked to take a demographic
survey. The app overlayed a warning dialog whenever the participant encountered an
email with a link or attachment. When the participant interacted with an email that has a
link or attachment, the unique email number of the simulated email and whether the
participant clicked on the link was stored.
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Chapter 4
Results
Overview
This chapter presents the results of the data collection and analysis from this research
study. The main goal was to determine whether requiring e-mail users to pause by
displaying a colored warning (grey, red, or black text) with a timer (countdown, countup, or no counter) when they are presented with a potentially malicious link has any
effect on the percentage of users falling to phishing attempts. For Phase I, 257 SMEs
participated by completing the SMEs survey and a Delphi methodology was used, which
resulted in two rounds to reach consensus. The SMEs validated the three timer values to
use, the sample emails to use, and the experimental process used in the PAT mobile app.
Phase II used the results from Phase I and consisted of the PAT app development. Phase
III included a pilot test with 10 testers, in which PAT was adjusted based on the results,
and the main data collection utilizing 106 participants. SPSS version 26 was used to
calculate ANOVA and ANCOVA which were used to analyze the data collected in Phase
III.
Phase I – SMEs Survey Feedback and Findings
RQ1 was answered using the findings from the SMEs survey. An invitation was
posted on Facebook and LinkedIn requesting participation from cybersecurity experts and
an encouragement to share the post. The result was that 257 responses were collected.
However, many of these responses appeared to be invalid, and 214 responses were
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excluded for a remaining total of 42 responses. Determining validity was based on
responses in the email validation section. If a participant selected adjust or replace and
did not provide comments as to how or why for more than half of the emails, their results
were excluded from the study. Table 14 provides descriptive statistics of the 42 SMEs.
The SMEs included network security or cybersecurity engineers (16.67%), cybersecurity
analysts (35.71%), information security managers (11.90%), information technology
auditors (7.14%), a cybersecurity administrator (2.38%), cybersecurity consultants
(9.52%), and cybersecurity architects (16.67%). The years of experience held by the
SMEs were between one and three years (30.95%), between three and five years
(33.33%), between five and ten years (19.05%), and more than ten years (16.67%). No
SMEs had less than one year of experience. The number of certifications held by the
SMEs included no certifications (9.52%), one certification (42.86%), two certifications
(33.33%), three certifications (9.52%), and four or more certifications (4.76%).
Table 14
Summary of SME Demographics (N = 42)
Demographic Item

N

%

Network Security or
Cybersecurity Engineer

7

16.67%

Cybersecurity Analyst

15

35.71%

Information Security Manager

5

11.90%

3

7.14%

Cybersecurity Administrator

1

2.38%

Cybersecurity Consultant

4

9.52%

Cybersecurity Architect

7

16.67%

Current Position

Information Technology
Auditor
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Table 14
Summary of SME Demographics (N = 42) – (continued)
Demographic Item

N

%

0

0.00%

13

30.95%

14

33.33%

8

19.05%

7

16.67%

4

9.52%

One

18

42.86%

Two

14

33.33%

Three

4

9.52%

2

4.76%

0

0.00%

2

4.76%

26

61.90%

8

19.05%

6

14.29%

18-19

0

0.00%

20-29

17

40.48%

30-39

15

35.71%

40-49

6

14.29%

50-59

4

9.52%

over 60

0

0.00%

Experience in Cybersecurity
Less than one year
At least one year, but less than
3 years
At least three years, but less
than 5 years
At least 5 years, but less than
10 years
10 years or more
Number of Cybersecurity
Certifications
None

Four or More
Highest level of Education
Completed
High School Diploma
2-Year College (Associates
degree)
4-Year College (Bachelor's
degree)
Graduate degree
Doctorate/Professional
Age

Phase 1 - RQ1
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Phase I addressed RQ1: What are the three timer values to require the user to pause
that should be used in this experimental field study to assess users’ ability to identify
malicious links in e-mail according to cybersecurity SMEs? This research question was
answered with data from the Timer Survey section of the SME survey and a two-round
Delphi process. When selecting their first choice for timer value, 15 SMEs (35.71%)
chose 1-second, two SMEs (4.76%) chose 3-seconds, four SMEs (9.52%) chose 5seconds, four SMEs (9.52%) chose 7-seconds, three SMEs (7.14%) chose 10-seconds,
three SMEs (7.14%) chose 20-seconds, and eight SMEs (19.05%) chose 30-seconds.
When selecting their second choice for timer value, two SMEs (4.76%) chose 1-second,
14 SMEs (33.33%) chose 3-seconds, three SMEs (7.15%) chose 5-seconds, one SME
(2.38%) chose 7-seconds, seven SMEs (16.67%) chose 10-seconds, eight SMEs (19.05%)
chose 20-seconds, and no SMEs (0%) chose 30-seconds. When selecting their third
choice for timer value, one SME (2.38%) chose 1-second, five SMEs (11.90%) chose 3seconds, 11 SMEs (26.19%) chose 5-seconds, nine SMEs (21.43%) chose 7-seconds, two
SMEs (16.67%) chose 10-seconds, two SMEs (4.76%) chose 20-seconds, and three
SMEs (7.14%) chose 30-seconds. The first-round data was summarized and given to six
SMEs to gain a consensus of the final three values to use. A summary of the first-round
SME timer value selections is shown in Table 15.
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Table 15
Summary of SME Timer Value Selections (N = 42)
Timer value

N

%

First Choice

Timer value

N

%

Second Choice

1-second

15

35.71%

1-second

2

4.76%

3-seconds

2

4.76%

3-seconds

14

33.33%

5-seconds

4

9.52%

5-seconds

3

7.14%

7-seconds

4

9.52%

7-seconds

1

2.38%

10-seconds

3

7.14%

10-seconds

7

16.67%

20-seconds

3

7.14%

20-seconds

8

19.05%

30-seconds

8

19.05%

30-seconds

0

0.00%

Third Choice

Fourth Choice

1-second

1

2.38%

1-second

2

4.76%

3-seconds

5

11.90%

3-seconds

1

2.38%

5-seconds

11

26.19%

5-seconds

5

11.90%

7-seconds

9

21.43%

7-seconds

10

23.81%

10-seconds

2

4.76%

10-seconds

12

28.57%

20-seconds

2

4.76%

20-seconds

4

9.52%

30-seconds

3

7.14%

30-seconds

4

9.52%

Fifth Choice

Sixth Choice

1-second

1

2.38%

1-second

4

9.52%

3-seconds

3

7.14%

3-seconds

2

4.76%

5-seconds

2

4.76%

5-seconds

13

30.95%

7-seconds

14

33.33%

7-seconds

2

4.76%

10-seconds

9

21.43%

10-seconds

3

7.14%

20-seconds

2

4.76%

20-seconds

1

2.38%

30-seconds

4

9.52%

30-seconds

7

16.67%

Seventh Choice

Eighth Choice

1-second

1

2.38%

1-second

16

38.06%

3-seconds

13

30.95%

3-seconds

2

4.76%

5-seconds

3

7.14%

5-seconds

1

2.38%

7-seconds

1

2.38%

7-seconds

1

2.38%

10-seconds

1

2.38%

10-seconds

5

11.90%

20-seconds

20

47.62%

20-seconds

2

4.76%

30-seconds

1

2.38%

30-seconds

15

35.71%
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Phase I – RQ2
Phase I also addressed RQ2: What level of functional correctness and validity of the
custom-designed mobile app is sufficient according to cybersecurity SMEs? This
research question was answered with the Verification of Sample Emails and the Mobile
App Experimental Procedure sections of the SME survey. In the Verification of Sample
Emails section, of 10 sample phishing emails, the majority of SMEs correctly identified
only one phishing sample email as phishing. Many of the phishing sample emails were
adjusted or replaced based on SME quantitative feedback. Of 20 legitimate sample
emails, most SMEs correctly identified 14 legitimate sample emails as legitimate. The
majority of SMEs recommended keeping all sample emails. The Verification of Sample
Emails data is summarized in Table 16.
Table 16
Summary of Verification of Sample Emails Data (N = 42)
Sample Email
Email 1: Legitimate URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 1: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 3: Legitimate text
only
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 3: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

11
27
4

26.19%
64.29%
9.52%

40
1
1

95.24%
2.38%
2.38%

14
25
3

33.33%
59.52%
7.14%

39
2
1

92.86%
4.76%
2.38%

Sample Email
Email 2: Legitimate URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 2: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 4: Phishing
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 4: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

17
20
5

40.48%
47.62%
11.90%

39
3
0

92.86%
7.14%
0.00%

17
21
4

40.48%
50.00%
9.52%

42
0
0

100.00%
0.00%
0.00%

112

Table 16
Summary of Verification of Sample Email Data (N = 42) – (continued)
Sample Email
Email 5: Legitimate URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 5: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

11
21
10

26.19%
50.00%
23.81%

41
1
0

97.62%
2.38%
0.00%

5
32
5

11.90%
76.19%
11.90%

36
5
1

85.71%
11.90%
2.38%

19
19
4

45.24%
45.24%
9.52%

36
5
1

85.71%
11.90%
2.38%

17
22
3

40.48%
52.38%
7.14%

36
4
2

85.71%
9.52%
4.76%

Email 7: Legitimate URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 7: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 9: Phishing URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 9: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 11: Phishing
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 11: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

Sample Email
Email 6: Legitimate URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 6: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 8: Phishing
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 8: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 10: Legitimate
URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 10: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 12: Phishing
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 12: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

15
25
2

35.71%
59.52%
4.76%

41
1
0

97.62%
2.38%
0.00%

19
21
2

45.24%
50.00%
4.76%

38
3
1

90.48%
7.14%
2.38%

10
29
3

23.81%
69.05%
7.14%

37
3
2

88.10%
7.14%
4.76%

18
21
3

42.86%
50.00%
7.14%

37
3
2

88.10%
7.14%
4.76%
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Table 16
Summary of Verification of Sample Email Data (N = 42) – (continued)
Sample Email

N

%

12
28
2

28.57%
66.67%
4.76%

37
5
0

88.10%
11.90%
0.00%

17
9
6

40.48%
21.43%
14.29%

35
7
0

83.33%
16.67%
0.00%

Email 13: Phishing URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 13: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 15: Phishing URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 15: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 17: Legitimate text
only
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 17: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 19: Legitimate text
only
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 19: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

Sample Email
Email 14: Legitimate text
only
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 14: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 16: Legitimate text
only
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 16: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

12
26
4

28.57%
61.90%
9.52%

33
6
3

78.57%
14.29%
7.14%

6
32
4

14.29%
76.19%
9.52%

34
6
2

80.95%
14.29%
4.76%

18
22
2

42.86%
52.38%
4.76%

37
4
1

88.10%
9.52%
2.38%

17
24
1

40.48%
57.14%
2.38%

34
4
0

80.95%
9.52%
0.00%

Email 18: Phishing URL
15
25
2

35.71%
59.52%
4.76%

38
4
0

90.48%
9.52%
0.00%

16
21
5

38.10%
50.00%
11.90%

36
6
0

85.71%
14.29%
0.00%

Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 18: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 20: Legitimate
URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 20: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
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Table 16
Summary of Verification of Sample Email Data (N = 42) – (continued)
Sample Email
Email 21: Legitimate text
only
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 21: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 23: Legitimate
URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 23: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 25: Legitimate
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 25: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 27: Legitimate
URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 27: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

18
19
5

42.86%
45.24%
11.90%

34
7
1

80.95%
16.67%
2.38%

19
19
4

45.24%
45.24%
9.52%

38
3
1

90.48%
7.14%
2.38%

12
25
5

28.57%
59.52%
11.90%

37
4
1

88.10%
9.52%
2.38%

Sample Email
Email 22: Legitimate
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 22: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 24: Phishing
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 24: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
Email 26: Legitimate
attachment
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 26: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

17
21
4

40.48%
50.00%
9.52%

37
5
0

88.10%
11.90%
0.00%

12
26
4

28.57%
61.90%
9.52%

41
0
1

97.62%
0.00%
2.38%

10
31
1

23.81%
73.81%
2.38%

39
2
1

92.86%
4.76%
2.38%

14
27
1

33.33%
64.29%
2.38%

38
3
1

90.48%
7.14%
2.38%

Email 28: Phishing URL
10
29
3

23.81%
69.05%
7.14%

35
5
2

83.33%
11.90%
4.76%

Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 28: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace
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Table 16
Summary of Verification of Sample Email Data (N = 42) – (continued)
Sample Email

N

%

14
23
5

33.33%
54.76%
11.90%

35
6
1

83.33%
14.29%
2.38%

Email 29: Legitimate URL
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 29: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

Sample Email
Email 30: Legitimate text
only
Phishing
Legitimate
Unsure
Email 30: Validation
Keep
Adjust
Replace

N

%

6
29
7

14.29%
69.05%
16.67%

38
4
0

90.48%
9.52%
0.00%

In the Mobile App Experimental Procedure section of the SME survey, SMEs were
asked whether major components of the PAT process should be kept, adjusted, or
removed. The majority of SMEs recommended keep for all of the components of PAT. A
summary of data for the Mobile App Experimental Procedure section is in Table 17.
Table 17
Summary of Mobile App Experimental Procedure Validation (N = 42)
Question

N

%

Keep

38

90.48%

Adjust

4

9.52%

Remove

0

0.00%

1. Pilot Experimental
Procedure: Post invitation on
Facebook and Linked In

Question
2. Pilot Experimental Procedure:
When a potential pilot
participant expresses interest,
send a welcome email with
directions to download PAT
along with steps to take to test
the app.
Keep

N

%

38

90.48%

Adjust

4

9.52%

Remove

0

0.00%
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Table 17
Summary of Mobile App Experimental Procedure Validation (N = 42) – (continued)
Question

N

%

3. Pilot Experimental
Procedure: The pilot
participants will be asked to fill
out a Google survey with the
results of their test. They will
be directed to email the
researcher if they encounter
issues not covered on the
survey.

Question

N

%

4. Pilot Experimental Procedure:
If issues not covered on the
survey are encountered, the pilot
participant will be asked to meet
the researcher over Zoom so that
the researcher can understand
the issue

Keep

37

88.10%

Keep

36

85.71%

Adjust

5

11.90%

Adjust

4

9.52%

Remove

0

0.00%

2

4.76%

Keep

39

92.86%

36

85.71%

Adjust

3

7.14%

6

14.29%

Remove

0

0.00%

0

0.00%

Keep

37

88.10%

34

80.95%

Adjust

4

9.52%

Adjust

6

14.29%

Remove

1

2.38%

Remove

2

4.76%

5. Main Experimental
Procedures: Post invitation on
Facebook and Linked In.

7. Main Experimental
Procedures: When a participant
first uses the app, the variable
values for timer value, timer
type (countdown/count-up) and
text color (red/grey/black) will
be randomly assigned and used
for the duration of that
participant’s participation in the
study.

Remove
6. Main Experimental
Procedures: When a potential
participant expresses interest,
send a welcome email to them
that includes directions to
download and install PAT.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
8. Main Experimental
Procedures: The participant will
be asked to create an account.
After the account is created, the
participant will receive a
notification reminder each
morning until the app is
uninstalled to interact with PAT.
While the participant’s email
address will be captured, the
email address will be paired
with an arbitrarily assigned
participant id which will be used
later to identify that participant’s
data.
Keep
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Table 17
Summary of Mobile App Experimental Procedure Validation (N = 42) – (continued)
Question

N

%

Question

N

%

10. Main Experimental
Procedures: Each time the
participant interacts with an
email, if the email has a link or
an attachment, the following
data will be sent to a Google
form: text color, timer type,
timer value, sample email id,
participant id, and whether or
not participant followed the link
or attachment.

9. Main Experimental
Procedures: Upon opening the
app for the first time and after
account creation, the
participant will be asked to
complete the demographic
survey within the app (data
from this step will be sent to a
Google spreadsheet doc).

Keep

37

88.10%

Keep

39

92.86%

Adjust

5

11.90%

Adjust

3

7.14%

Remove

0

0.00%

Remove

0

0.00%

Phase II – PAT Mobile App Development
Phase II consisted of the development of PAT. The development of PAT used SME
feedback on timer value, sample email verification, and the mobile app experimental
procedures. PAT was tested and deployed to both the Apple Store and Google Play.
Development of the app included two-factor authentication to ensure participant validity
and uniqueness. The PAT login screen is shown in Figure 6.
After the participants registered and logged in for the first time, they were asked
demographic questions that included, age, gender, education level, volume of email, and
a set of five questions designed to capture the value of the participant’s attention span.
The demographic survey was reviewed by the NSU IRB before it was presented to
participants.
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Figure 6
PAT Mobile App – Login Screen Example

When the participant logged in at least one day after registering, a simulated
inbox was displayed as shown in Figure 7. Simulated emails were coded based on SMEs
feedback in Phase I. When a participant in the experimental group tapped on an email
with a link or attachment, the simulated email opened and a timer dialog was displayed,
as shown in Figure 8. After the timer dialog self-dismissed, if the participant tapped on
the link, an acknowledgement of the tap was displayed, as shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 7

Figure 8

PAT Simulated Inbox

PAT Simulated Email with Timer

Figure 9
PAT Action After Link Tapped
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Phase III – PAT Mobile App Delivery
Phase III involved participant download, installation, and use of PAT. Data collection
occurred between April 5, 2021, and April 28, 2021. The participants were recruited
through Facebook and LinkedIn. A total of 117 participants downloaded the PAT mobile
app and participated in the study.
Phase III – Pilot Testing
Of the 117 participants who participated, 10 were pilot testers. Five each of the pilot
testers were Apple and Android users. Each tester was given a list of actions to take with
the app. Each tester met with the researcher in person or online and the researcher
watched the tester use the app. Minor issues were found and fixed.
Phase III – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Other than the pilot testers, 107 users participated in the study. One user indicated
that they were completely color blind. The results from that user were excluded from the
study. The total remaining number of participants was 106. Any email interaction records
that indicated that the participant did not open the email were excluded from the study.
The number of email interactions collected was 3,746 (106 participants interacting with
five emails per day for seven days on average). The data were filtered to include only
email interactions with the simulated phishing emails for a remaining total of 1,796 email
interactions. The data were screened using Mahalanobis Distance, and, using a p value of
.001, no record was found to be a multivariate outlier.
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Phase III – Participant Demographic Characteristics
The 106 participants included several demographic characteristics. Demographic
information is shown in Table 18. Of device types, 63 (58.33%) used Apple and 43
(39.81%) used Android.
Table 18
Descriptive Statistics of Study Participants (N = 106)
Demographic Item
Apple or Android
Apple
Android
Age
18 - 25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
66-75
older than 75
Gender
Female
Male
Education Level
Below High School
High School
Some Higher-Education Credits
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree
Doctorate Degree or comparable
Volume of Email Received
1-10 emails per day
11-30 emails per day
31-60 emails per day
61-90 emails per day
91-120 emails per day
121-150 emails per day
More than 150 emails per day

N

%

62
44

58.49%
41.51%

1
13
28
40
18
5
1

0.94%
12.26%
26.42%
37.74%
16.98%
4.72%
0.94%

70
36

66.04%
33.96%

0
2
11
6
27
41
19

0.00%
1.89%
10.38%
5.66%
25.47%
38.68%
17.92%

8
32
27
19
8
5
7

7.55%
30.19%
25.47%
17.92%
7.55%
4.72%
6.60%

122

Table 18
Descriptive Statistics of Study Participants (N = 106) – continued
Demographic Item
Attention Span
Very low attention span
Low attention span
Somewhat low attention span
Average attention span
Somewhat high attention span
High attention span
Very high attention span

N

%

5
15
21
26
19
15
5

4.72%
14.15%
19.81%
24.53%
17.92%
14.15%
4.72%

Of the participant ages, one was 18-19 (0.93%), 13 were 26-35 (12.04%), 28 were 36-45
(25.93%), 40 were 46-55 (37.04%), 18 were 56-65 (16.67%), five were 66-75 (4.63%),
and one was over 75 (0.93%). Of participant genders, 70 were female (64.81%) and 36
were male (33.33%). Of education level, no participants had a Below High School
education and two (1.85%) had a High School education. Eleven (10.19%) participants
had Some Higher Education Credits, six (5.56%) had an Associate Degree, 27 (25.00%)
had a Bachelor’s Degree, 41 (37.96%) had a Master’s Degree, and 19 (17.59%) had a
Doctorate Degree or comparable. Of volume of email, eight (7.41%) had 1-10 emails per
day, 32 (29.63%) had 11-30 emails per day, 27 (25.00%) had 31-60 emails per day, 19
(17.59%) had 61-90 emails per day, eight (7.41%) had 91-120 emails per day, five
(4.63%) had 121-150 emails per day, and seven (6.48%) had more than 150 emails per
day. Attention span was aggregated from the five attention span demographic survey
questions so that a lower score means a lower attention span. The first four attention span
questions were negatively worded using a score of (1) for ‘Very untrue of me’ to (7) for
‘Untrue of me’. The fifth attention span question was positively worded using a score of
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(7) for ‘Very untrue of me’ to (1) for ‘Untrue of me’. Each question was scored and
added so that the minimum score was five, meaning that the participant scored the lowest
attention span choice in each of the five questions. The maximum score was 33, which
means that the highest-scoring participant scored two fewer than the possible maximum
of 35 (five questions times a score of seven per question). The range of scores was then
grouped so that scores of five through eight were coded as Very low attention span,
scores of nine through 12 were coded as Low attention span, scores of 13 through 16
were scored as Somewhat low attention span, scores of 17 through 20 were scored as
Average attention span, scores of 21 through 24 were scored as Somewhat high attention
span, scores of 25 through 28 were scored as High attention span, and scores of 29
through 33 were scored as Very high attention span. The attention span grouping is
summarized in Table 19.
Table 19
Attention Span Grouping Summary
Score group
5-8
9-12
13-16
17-20
21-24
25-28
29-33

Coding
Very low attention span
Low attention span
Somewhat low attention span
Average attention span
Somewhat high attention span
High attention span
Very high attention span

Phase III – RQ3
Phase III addressed RQ3: Are there statistically significant mean differences between
the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer values displayed
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with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black text? To answer RQ3, 3,746 email
interactions were collected (106 participants interacting with 5 emails per day for 7 days
on average). The data were filtered to include only email interactions with the simulated
phishing emails for a remaining total of 1,796 email interactions. ANOVA was used to
test for significant differences between groups. The results of the ANOVA showed there
were significant differences among all groups for Text Color, Timer Value, and Text
Color x Timer Value. The F-value for Text Color was 20.852 and had a significance of p
< .001. The F-value for Timer Value was 3.700 and had a significance of p < .05. The Fvalue for Text Color x Timer Value was 2.899 and had a significance of p < .01. The
results of the ANOVA to answer RQ3 are shown in Table 20.
Table 20
ANOVA Results of Difference in Text Color and Timer Value in Email Interactions
(N=1796)
Source
Between
Treatments
Text Color
Timer Value
Text Color x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total

Sum of Squares
11.787

Df
11

Mean Square
1.072

F
7.385

Sig.
.000***

6.051
1.611
2.524

2
3
6

3.025
.537
.421

20.852
3.700
2.899

.000***
.011*
.008**

258.841

1784

.145

6188.000

1796

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

The profile plot of Text Color x Timer Value is shown in Figure 10. The value of the
Estimated Marginal Means of Clicked range from one, meaning Not Clicked, to two,
meaning Clicked. The black line indicates the mean click rate for email interactions that
included a dialog box in black text. Likewise, the grey line represents the mean click rate
for email interactions that included a dialog box in grey text, and the red line indicates the
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mean click rate that included a dialog box in red text. The profile plot indicates that grey
and red text performed better overall than black text, meaning that the user was less likely
to click on a malicious link if the text color was in grey or red. The profile plot shows that
the best combination of text color and timer value was grey text at 7-seconds. This
combination had the lowest click mean at 1.65. The second-best combination was red text
at 3-seconds. The click mean for this combination was approximately 1.67.
Figure 10
Profile Plot of Text Color x Timer Value

Phase III – RQ4
Phase III addressed RQ4: Are there statistically significant mean differences between
the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer values displayed
with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no timer? To answer RQ4, the data
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were filtered to include only email interactions with the simulated phishing emails.
ANOVA was used to test for significant differences between groups. The results of the
ANOVA showed there were significant differences only in the Timer Type x Timer
Value group. The F-value for Timer Type x Timer Value was p < .05. The results of the
ANOVA to answer RQ4 are shown in Table 21.
Table 21
ANOVA Results of Difference in Timer Type and Timer Value in Email Interactions
(N=1796)
Source
Between
Treatments
Timer Type
Timer Value
Timer Type x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total

Sum of
Squares
5.172

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

6

.862

5.810

.000***

.049
.655
1.039

1
2
2

.049
.327
.520

.328
2.207
3.501

.567
.110
.030*

265.456

1789

.148

6188.000

1796

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

The profile plot for Timer Type x Timer Value is shown in Figure 11. No timer is
represented by only a dot because there was no timer value for dialogs with no timer. The
worst combinations of Timer Type and Timer Value were no timer and no time and a
countdown timer at 7-seconds, both at a mean click rate of approximately 1.88. The best
combination of Timer Type and Timer Value was a timer counting down for 5-seconds at
a mean click rate of approximately 1.75.
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Figure 11
Profile Plot of Timer Type x Timer Value

Phase III – RQ5a
Phase III addressed RQ5a: Are there statistically significant mean differences
between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not
required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer values
displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black text based on the categories of:
(a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level, (d) the volume of email the user receives in a day,
and (e) attention span? To answer RQ5a, the data were filtered to include only email
interactions with the simulated phishing emails. ANCOVA was used to test for
significant differences between groups with each demographic indicator as a covariate.
The results of ANCOVA using all five demographic indicators (age, gender, education
level, email volume, and attention span) showed significance. When age was used as a
covariate, the F-value for Text Color was p < .001 and the F-value for Text Color x
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Timer Value was p < .05. When gender was used as a covariate, the F-value for Text
Color was p < .001, the F-value for Timer Value was p < .05, and the F-value for Text
Color x Timer Value was p < .01. When education level was used as a covariate, the Fvalue for Text Color was p < .001, the F-value for Timer Value was p < .01, and the Fvalue for Text Color x Timer Value was p < .05. When email volume was used as a
covariate, the F-value for Text Color was p < .001, the F-value for Timer Value was p <
.05, and the F-value for Text Color x Timer Value was p < .01. When attention span was
used as a covariate, the F-value for Text Color was p < .001, the F-value for Timer Value
was p < .05, and the F-value for Text Color x Timer Value was p < .01. The results of the
ANCOVA answering RQ5a are shown in Table 22.
Table 22
ANCOVA Results of Difference in and Text Color and Timer Value in Email Interactions
(N=1796)
Source

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Age

.135

1

.135

.931

.335

Between
Treatments

11.922

12

.994

6.847

.000***

Text Color

5.770

2

2.885

19.884

.000***

Timer Value

.135

1

.135

.931

.335

2.428

6

.405

2.789

.011*

258.706

1783

.145

6188.000

1796

Text Color x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 22
ANCOVA Results of Difference in and Text Color and Timer Value in Email Interactions
(N=1796) –continued
Source

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Gender

.027

1

.027

.185

.667

Between
Treatments

11.814

12

.985

6.782

.000***

Text Color

6.050

2

3.025

20.841

.000***

Timer Value

1.613

3

.538

3.703

.011*

2.545

6

.424

2.923

.008**

258.814

1783

.145

6188.000

1796

2.093

1

2.093

14.533

.000***

13.880

12

1.157

8.032

.000***

Text Color

6.101

2

3.051

21.185

.000***

Timer Value

1.810

3

.603

4.191

.006**

2.257

6

.376

2.612

.016*

256.748

1783

.144

Total

6188.000

1796

Email Volume

.960

1

.960

6.641

.010*

Between
Treatments

12.748

12

1.062

7.345

.000***

Text Color

6.074

2

3.037

20.998

.000***

Timer Value

1.607

3

.536

3.705

.011*

2.547

6

.424

2.935

.007**

257.880

1783

.145

6188.000

1796

Text Color x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total
Education
Level
Between
Treatments

Text Color x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments

Text Color x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 22
ANCOVA Results of Difference in and Text Color and Timer Value in Email Interactions
(N=1796) –continued
Source

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Attention Span

.023

1

.023

.160

.690

Between
Treatments

11.810

12

.984

6.780

.000***

Text Color

6.042

2

3.021

20.813

.000***

Timer Value

1.626

3

.542

3.733

.011*

2.523

6

.421

2.897

.008**

258.818

1783

.145

6188.000

1796

Text Color x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Profile plots of Text Color x Timer Value with each covariate were performed and
appear in Figures 12 through 16. Figure 12 shows the profile plot of Text Color x Timer
Value with age as a covariate. Figure 13 shows the profile plot of Text Color x Timer
Value with gender as a covariate. Figure 14 shows the profile plot of Text Color x Timer
Value with education level as a covariate. Figure 15 shows the profile plot of Text Color
x Timer Value with email volume as a covariate. Figure 16 shows the profile plot of Text
Color x Timer Value with attention span as a covariate.
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Figure 12
Profile Plot of Text Color x Timer Value with Age as a Covariate

Figure 13
Profile Plot of Text Color x Timer Value with Gender as a Covariate
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Figure 14
Profile Plot of Text Color x Timer Value with Education Level as a Covariate

Figure 15
Profile Plot of Text Color x Timer Value with Email Volume as a Covariate
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Figure 16
Profile Plot of Text Color x Timer Value with Attention Span as a Covariate

Phase III – RQ5b
Phase III addressed RQ5b: Are there statistically significant mean differences
between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not
required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer values
displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no timer based on the
categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level, (d) the volume of email the user
receives in a day, and (e) attention span? To answer RQ5b, the data were filtered to
include only email interactions with the simulated phishing emails. ANCOVA was used
to test for significant differences between groups with each demographic indicator as a
covariate. The results of ANCOVA using all five demographic indicators (age, gender,
education level, email volume, and attention span) showed significance. F-value for
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Timer Type x Timer Value was p < .05 for all demographic factors. The results of the
ANCOVA answering RQ5a are shown in Table 23.
Table 23
ANCOVA Results of Difference in Timer Type and Timer Value in Email Interactions
(N=1796)
Source

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Age

0.469

1

0.469

3.162

0.076

Between
Treatments

5.641

7

0.806

5.437

.000***

Timer Type

0.035

1

0.035

0.234

0.629

Timer Value

0.642

2

0.321

2.167

0.115

1.04

2

0.52

3.51

.030*

264.987

1788

0.148

Total

6188

1796

Gender

0.011

1

0.011

0.075

0.784

Between
Treatments

5.183

7

0.74

4.988

.000***

Timer Type

0.049

1

0.049

0.333

0.564

Timer Value

0.654

2

0.327

2.204

0.111

1.04

2

0.52

3.502

.030*

265.445

1788

0.148

2.178

1

2.178

14.79

.000***

7.35

7

1.05

7.131

.000***

Timer Type

0.033

1

0.033

0.226

0.634

Timer Value

0.652

2

0.326

2.213

0.11

1.027

2

0.513

3.486

.031*

263.278

1788

0.147

6188

1796

Timer Type x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments

Timer Type x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Education
Level
Between
Treatments

Timer Type x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 23
ANCOVA Results of Difference in Timer Type and Timer Value in Email Interactions
(N=1796) – (continued)
Source

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Email Volume

0.939

1

0.939

6.348

.012*

Between
Treatments

6.111

7

0.873

5.901

.000***

Timer Type

0.048

1

0.048

0.327

0.567

Timer Value

0.679

2

0.339

2.294

0.101

1.041

2

0.52

3.517

.030*

264.517

1788

0.148

6188

1796

0.032

1

0.032

0.214

0.644

5.204

7

0.743

5.008

.000***

Timer Type

0.049

1

0.049

0.327

0.567

Timer Value

0.654

2

0.327

2.204

0.111

1.036

2

0.518

3.491

.031*

265.424

1788

0.148

6188

1796

Timer Type x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total
Attention
Span
Between
Treatments

Timer Type x
Timer Value
Within
Treatments
Total

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Profile plots of Timer Type x Timer Value with each covariate were performed and
appear in Figures 17 through 21. Figure 17 shows the profile plot of Timer Type x Timer
Value with age as a covariate. Figure 18 shows the profile plot of Timer Type x Timer
Value with gender as a covariate. Figure 19 shows the profile plot of Timer Type x Timer
Value with education level as a covariate. Figure 20 shows the profile plot of Timer Type
x Timer Value with email volume as a covariate. Figure 21 shows the profile plot of
Timer Type x Timer Value with attention span as a covariate.
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Figure 17
Profile Plot of Timer Type x Timer Value with Age as a Covariate

Figure 18
Profile Plot of Timer Type x Timer Value with Gender as a Covariate
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Figure 19
Profile Plot of Timer Type x Timer Value with Education Level as a Covariate

Figure 20
Profile Plot of Timer Type x Timer Value with Email Volume as a Covariate
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Figure 21
Profile Plot of Timer Type x Timer Value with Attention Span as a Covariate

Phase III – RQ5 – Age Group
The age demographic was analyzed using the click mean and standard deviation of
all the email interactions with the simulated phishing emails. A summary of this data is
shown in Table 24 and displayed in Figure 22. The age demographic that performed the
best (had the lowest click mean) was 18-25. The age demographic that appeared to
perform the worst was Older than 75, although only one participant was in that
demographic, so generalization is difficult.
Phase III – RQ5 – Gender Group
The gender demographic was analyzed using the click mean and standard deviation
of all the email interactions with the simulated phishing emails. A summary of this data is
shown in Table 25 and displayed in Figure 23. The click mean for both genders was very
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similar, indicating that gender may not be a factor in ability to avoid clicking a malicious
link or attachment.
Table 24
Summary of Age Demographic with Respect to Click Mean
Click Mean
1.33
1.79
1.84
1.85
1.73
1.89
1.9

18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
66-75
Older than 75

Std Dev
0.479
0.407
0.368
0.354
0.444
0.311
0.308

Figure 22
Summary of Age Demographic with Respect to Click Mean

Age
2.5

Click Mean

2

1.5

1

0.5

0
18-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

Age

56-65

66-75

Older than 75
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Table 25
Summary of Gender Demographic with Respect to Click Mean
Click Mean
1.81
1.82

Female
Male

Std Dev
0.391
0.383

Figure 23
Summary of Gender Demographic with Respect to Click Mean

Gender
2.5

Click Mean

2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Female

Male

Gender

Phase III – RQ5 – Education Level Group
The education level demographic was analyzed using the click mean and standard
deviation of all the email interactions with the simulated phishing emails. A summary of
this data is shown in Table 26 and displayed in Figure 24. The Associates degree
demographic performed the worst at a click mean of 1.94, and the High school
demographic performed the best at 1.48. This indicates that a higher level of education
may not mitigate the user’s ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link or attachment.
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Phase III – RQ5 – Volume of Email Group
The volume of email demographic was analyzed using the click mean and standard
deviation of all the email interactions with the simulated phishing emails. A summary of
this data is shown in Table 27 and displayed in Figure 25. The 1-10 emails per day
demographic performed the best at a click mean of 1.68, and the 121-150 emails per day
demographic performed the worst at a click mean of 1.97. This indicates that fewer
emails per day help the user to avoid clicking on a malicious email or attachment.
Table 26
Summary of Education Level Demographic with Respect to Click Mean

Below high school
High school
Some higher education credits
Associates degree
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate

Click Mean
0
1.48
1.75
1.94
1.8
1.8
1.87

Std Dev
0
0.509
0.432
0.229
0.4
0.4
0.338

Phase III – RQ5 – Attention Span Score Group
The attention span demographic was analyzed using the click mean and standard
deviation of all the email interactions with the simulated phishing emails. A summary of
this data is shown in Table 28 and displayed in Figure 26. The Average attention span
and Somewhat high attention span demographics performed the best at a click mean of
1.76. The Very high attention span demographic performed the worst at a click mean rate
of 1.91. This is counter intuitive as it would be thought that those with a High attention
span would be alert to possible phishing attempts.
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Figure 24
Summary of Education Level Demographic with Respect to Click Mean

Education Level
2.5

Click Mean

2
1.5
1
0.5
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Below high High school Some higher Associates
school
education
degree
credits
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Doctorate

Education Level

Table 27
Summary of Volume of Email Demographic with Respect to Click Mean
Click Mean

Std Dev

1-10 emails per day

1.68

0.469

11-30 emails per day

1.86

0.352

31-60 emails per day

1.84

0.368

61-90 emails per day

1.8

0.399

91-120 emails per day

1.76

0.429

121-150 emails per day

1.97

0.172

More than 150 emails per day

1.75

0.437
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Figure 25
Summary of Volume of Email Demographic with Respect to Click Mean

Email Volume
2.5
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Table 28
Summary of Attention Span Demographic with Respect to Click Mean
Click Mean

Std Dev

Very low attention span

1.83

0.38

Low attention span

1.89

0.319

Somewhat low attention span

1.81

0.391

Average attention span

1.76

0.43

Somewhat high attention span

1.76

0.427

High attention span

1.87

0.336

Very high attention span

1.91

0.289

More than
150
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Figure 26
Summary of Attention Span Demographic with Respect to Click Mean
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Summary
The results and data collection were presented in this chapter. Phase I utilized data
from the SME survey to answer RQ1 and RQ2. The PAT mobile app was created and
partially tested in Phase II. Pilot testers completed the test of PAT in Phase III. Phase III
also included the main study which answered RQs3-5b. An ANOVA was performed on
the main study data to answer RQ3 and RQ4. An ANCOVA was performed on the main
study data to answer RQ5a and RQ5b.
The results of a two-round Delphi process in Phase I indicated values of 3-seconds,
5-seconds, and 7-seconds as the timer values that should be used in the PAT mobile app.
Phase I results also validated the sample emails for use in the PAT mobile app as well as
the PAT experimental procedure. These data were used in the creation of the PAT mobile
app.
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Phase II resulted in the creation of the PAT mobile app. The app was created using
data from Phase I, including the timer values, which sample emails to use, and the
experimental procedure. The app was tested using pilot testers. Only minor bugs were
found and those were fixed before the main study.
Phase III indicated that a countdown timer at 3-seconds with a warning in a text
color in red was the most effective in supporting user ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link or attachment. All demographic indicators (age, gender, education level,
volume of email per day, and attention span) showed a level of significance.
The age demographic that performed the best (had the lowest click mean) was 1825. While the age demographic that appeared to perform the worst was Older than 75,
there was only one participant in that category, so generalization is difficult. The click
mean for both genders was very similar, indicating that gender may not be a factor in
ability to avoid clicking a malicious link or attachment. Of education level, the
Associates degree demographic performed the worst at a click mean of 1.94, and the
High school demographic performed the best at 1.48. This indicates that a higher level of
education may not help to mitigate the user’s ability to avoid clicking on a malicious
email or attachment. The 1-10 emails per day demographic performed the best at a click
mean of 1.68, and the 121-150 emails per day demographic performed the worst at a
click mean of 1.97. This indicates that fewer emails per day may help to mitigate the
user’s ability to avoid clicking on a malicious email or attachment. The Average attention
span and Somewhat high attention span demographics performed the best at a click mean
of 1.76. The Very high attention span demographic performed the worst at a click mean
rate of 1.91. This is counter intuitive as it would be thought that those with a High
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attention span would be alert to possible phishing attempts. A summary of research
question results is shown in Table 29.
Table 29
Summary of Research Question Results
RQ

Result

RQ3

Are there statistically significant mean differences
between the ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link of e-mail users who are not required
to pause vs. email users who are required to pause
at three separate timer values displayed with a
warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black text?

Grey and red warning text
significantly improves a user's
ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious email when compared
to black text

RQ4

Are there statistically significant mean differences
between the ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link of e-mail users who are not required
to pause vs. email users who are required to pause
at three separate timer values displayed with: (a)
countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer?

A countdown timer provides the
most significant improvement in
a user's ability to avoid clicking
on a malicious email followed
by a count-up timer and no timer

RQ5a

Are there statistically significant mean differences
between the ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link of e-mail users who are not required
to pause vs. email users who are required to pause
at three separate timer values displayed with a
warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black text based
on the categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c)
education level, (d) the volume of email the user
receives in a day, and (e) attention span?

All five demographic indicators
were significant when used as a
covariate

RQ5b

Are there statistically significant mean differences
between the ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link of e-mail users who are not required
to pause vs. email users who are required to pause
at three separate timer values displayed with: (a)
countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer based on the categories of: (a) age, (b)
gender, (c) education level, (d) the volume of
email the user receives in a day, and (e) attention
span?

All five demographic indicators
were significant with respect to
Timer Type x Timer Value when
used as a covariate
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
Red or grey text helps the user’s ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link or
attachment more than black text does. This seems to follow other studies in which text
color was investigated (Nadeem & Junger, 2019; Silver et al., 2002). A countdown timer
is better than a count-up timer or no timer with respect to helping the user to avoid
clicking on a malicious link or attachment. This follows from studies found in healthcare
(Hung et al., 2020; Lindahl et al., 2019; Marto et al., 2016; Uddin et al., 2017), civil
engineering (Keegan & O’Mahony, 2003; Kitali et al., 2018), and psychology (Cheong,
2018). Education level appears to have the most positive influence on the user’s ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link or attachment both with respect to text warning color
and timer value and with respect to timer type and timer value. It appears that less formal
education and receiving fewer emails per day helps one’s ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link or attachment. This may be because less formally educated users are more
careful when responding to an email. This seems to contradict the findings of Ophoff and
Robinson (2014) who found formal education to be a positive influence on security
behavior. Younger people seem to have a higher ability to avoid clicking on a malicious
link or attachment, which agrees with the findings of Koyuncu and Pusatli (2019). There
appears to be no difference in gender regarding the ability to avoid clicking on a
malicious link or attachment, which seems to contradict Ngoqo and Flowerday (2015)
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who found that males have a higher security awareness. It also appears that a high
attention span counters one’s ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link or attachment.
This is counter intuitive, since it is be expected that individuals with a high attention span
would be more likely to have the focus required to analyze a possible phish.
The main goal of this research study was to determine through experimental field
study whether requiring e-mail users to pause by displaying a colored warning (grey, red,
or black text) with a timer (countdown, count-up, or no counter) when they are presented
with a potentially malicious link has any effect on the percentage of users falling to
phishing attempts. PAT successfully measured user interactions with text warning color
and a countdown and count-up timer. The data support the conclusion that a red or grey
warning and a timer, specifically a countdown timer, help the user to avoid clicking on a
malicious link or attachment.
Discussion
There are several implications for cybersecurity and phishing susceptibility
reduction. Warning text color and a timer in the warning dialog may play a significant
role in user reaction to a possible phish. In addition, age, gender, education level, volume
of email received in a day, and attention span may all affect the user’s ability to avoid
clicking on a malicious link or attachment.
Implications for Practice
While some corporations already present a colored warning dialog to employees
when employees receive an external email, there are no known corporations that employ
a timer dialog along with the warning. Corporations could implement a timer dialog to
accompany the existing warning text to provide more mitigation against phishing attacks
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against their employees. The results show that a countdown timer is more effective than a
count-up timer or no timer, lending validation to pedestrian countdown timers.
Implications for Research
Implications for research indicate that both red and grey warning text may be more
effective than black text. Timers have not been used in phishing mitigation research
previously, and these results show that using timers to mitigate phishing is worthy of
further research. The results show that a high attention span negatively effects the ability
to avoid clicking on a malicious link which is counter intuitive, and that users with less
formal education are more likely to avoid clicking on a malicious link. Future research
could investigate these relationships further.
Limitations
This study had several limitations. In Phase I, many invalid responses were
received, and this is possibly due to the offering of a $10 Amazon gift card. It would have
been helpful to ask on the SME survey where they found the survey (Facebook or
LinkedIn) as this would have helped to track the source of the invalid data. In Phase III,
there was a limitation in finding Android users to test the Android version of PAT. A few
minor bugs were found, but easily corrected. Loading the email simulations into the app
was difficult and time consuming. This can be mitigated in future studies by revising the
mechanism in which emails are loaded. As it was, each email with each variable value
had to be loaded separately, which meant that 21 versions of each email had to be loaded
(two timer types (countdown, count-up) x three colors (black, grey, red) x three timer
values (3-seconds, 5-seconds, 7-seconds) + three colors with no timer). During the main
study, participants were recruited through Facebook and LinkedIn which created a
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limitation of a non-random distribution. In the first few days of the main study data
collection, interaction was low. This was mitigated by posting daily reminders on
Facebook and LinkedIn. Also, there were a few minor issues with the simulated emails
not showing correctly in the app, but these issues were easily fixed. Many participants
were confused by what they were to do despite the directions given. It also appeared that
many participants did not read the directions as they asked questions that were answered
in the directions. Many participants also stated that they would not have clicked on any of
the simulated emails if they had been real. This can be mitigated in future studies by
modifying the PAT app to use the user’s name as a salutation in the simulated emails.
Another limitation was the use of the attention span survey from Psychology Today. A
future research recommendation is to develop a more valid and reliable instrument for
attention span.
Recommendations and Future Research
The PAT app could be updated to allow for faster loading of email simulations to
make it easier to set up a future study. Many participants stated that they would never
respond to an email that was not addressed to them. To address this, PAT could be
updated to incorporate the user’s name in the simulated emails. Multiple participants
indicated that they are used to being able to check the actual email address and/or URL
by hovering over the presented value. PAT could also be updated to include these
features. PAT could also be updated to allow users to categorize emails by junk or valid
by assigning the email to a folder and to validate the sender by simulating a block on the
sender email.
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Since the app was coded to auto-populate user simulated inboxes at a particular
time of day, the PAT app could be used to explore the effect of time of day on the ability
to avoid clicking on a malicious link or attachment. While not used in this study, the
warning message is able to be changed in the PAT app, so that a future study could
investigate word choice in a warning message. The data collected included whether the
participant was using an Apple or Android device although that data were not analyzed in
this study. A future study could investigate the effect of device usage on the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link or attachment including a small device such as a phone
versus a larger device such as a tablet.
Summary
In summary, a warning in colored text accompanied by a timer helps users to avoid
clicking on a malicious link or attachment. This study indicates that a warning in red text
accompanied by a countdown timer is the best combination of text and timer. In addition,
this study found that the demographic factors of age, gender, education level, email
volume, and attention span all influence the user’s ability to avoid clicking on a malicious
link or attachment.
The main research question that this study addressed is: Are there statistically
significant mean differences between the ability to avoid clicking on a malicious link of
e-mail users who are not required to pause vs. email users who are required to pause at
three separate timer values presented with a countdown or count-up timer with a red or
grey warning message?
The five specific research questions that this study addressed were:
RQ1: What are the three timer values to require the user to pause that should be

152

used in this experimental field study to assess users’ ability to identify
malicious links in e-mail according to cybersecurity SMEs?
RQ2: What level of functional correctness and validity of the custom-designed
mobile app is sufficient according to cybersecurity SMEs?
RQ3: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black warning
text?
RQ4: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer?
RQ5a: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
values displayed with a warning in (a) grey, (b) red, or (c) black warning
text based on the categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level, (d)
attention span, and (e) the volume of email that the user receives in a day?
RQ5b: Are there statistically significant mean differences between the ability to
avoid clicking on a malicious link of e-mail users who are not required to
pause vs. email users who are required to pause at three separate timer
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values displayed with: (a) countdown timer, (b) count-up timer, or (c) no
timer based on the categories of: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) education level,
(d) attention span, and (e) the volume of email that the user receives in a
day?
Phase I answered RQ1 and RQ2. SMEs identified the timer values to use as 3seconds, 5-seconds, and 7-seconds and gave feedback on the simulated emails to use in
the main study as well as the experimental procedures to be used in the main study. Phase
II involved the development of PAT, a mobile app that simulates an email inbox capable
of displaying a count-up or countdown timer along with specifically colored warning text
whenever a link or attachment is part of an email. Phase III answered RQ3-5b and
included a pilot study and the main study. The pilot test uncovered a few minor issues
that were easily fixed. Analysis of the data from the main study indicated that colored
warning text is more effective than black warning text, answering RQ3. A countdown
timer was found to be more effective than a count-up timer or no timer, answering RQ4.
The demographic indicators of age, gender, education level, email volume, and attention
span were all found to influence both text color, answering RQ5a, and timer type,
answering RQ5b.
Overall, this study used SME feedback to create a system to investigate whether
warning text color or a countdown or count-up timer is effective in helping users to avoid
clicking on a malicious link or attachment. The study results showed statistically
significant differences among participants presented with red or grey text as compared to
black text and presented with a countdown or count-up timer as compared to no timer.
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Participants were able to notice phishing emails with the assistance of text warning color
and a countdown or count-up timer.
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Appendix A
Example of SME Demographic Survey
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Appendix B
Example of SME Sample Email Question

3.1. Sample Email 1:
This is what the participants will see:

3.1.1. Please identify the sample email above as one of the following:
1. Legitimate
2. Phishing
3. Unsure

3.1.2 Please provide your expert opinion about the email sample above by
indicating:
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1. Keep—the proposed email sample should be included as it is.
2. Adjust—the proposed email sample should be included but with
modifications (please provide your feedback on the exact
modifications in the short text field in the space provided at the
end of this block).
3. Replace —the proposed email sample should be replaced with
another one (please provide reasons below why the sample email
should be replaced and propose a replacement email, if possible, in
the space provided at the end of this block).

3.1.3 If you selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3. Replace" for the sample email
above, please provide your recommended adjustments (or write "N/A" if
none).
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
3.1.4. Please provide additional feedback that you deem fit to be included
for sample email above (or write "N/A" if none).
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C
Example of SME Invitation Email

Dear Information Security Subject Matter Expert (SME),
I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems at the College of Engineering and
Computing of Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation is chaired by Dr. Yair
Levy. This work is part of the Levy Cylab Projects (http://CyLab.nova.edu/). My research
study is seeking to determine if requiring the user to pause can reduce the likelihood of
falling for phishing emails.
The goal of the experiment with which I am seeking assistance is to develop an
application that will require the user to pause for a certain period of time. The study will
be a mobile application that participants download to their mobile device. If the user
encounters an email with a link or an attachment, a dialog screen with either a countdown
or count-up timer will overlay the email. The user will not be able to interact with the
email until the timer has expired.
I am requesting your help to determine what the length of the timer should be.
By participating in this research study, you agree and understand that your responses are
voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no personal identifiable information will be
collected or traced back to anyone. Of course, you may stop your participation at any
time. As a token of appreciation for your security expert contribution to this research
study you will receive a $10 Amazon digital gift card to your email address upon
completing the survey instruments required to initiate this research study.
I appreciate your assistance and contribution to this research study. If you wish to receive
the findings of the study, feel free to contact me via email and I will be more than happy
to provide you with the information about the academic research publication resulting
from this study.
Please let me know if you would like to participate in this SME survey.
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Appendix D
Example of Participant Recruitment Message for Facebook and LinkedIn
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Appendix E
Example of Participant Invitation Email
I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems at the College of Engineering and
Computing of Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation is chaired by Dr. Yair
Levy. This work is part of the Levy Cylab Projects (http://CyLab.nova.edu/). I am
seeking participants for my dissertation study.
This study will require you to use a custom mobile app for one week. By participating in
this research study, you agree and understand that your responses are voluntary. All
responses are anonymous and no personal identifiable information will be collected. You
may stop your participation at any time.
If you would like to participate, please go to:
Pat_test.com to download the PAT Test App.
Following download, the test should not take more than 20 minutes.
Best Regards
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Appendix F
Example of Participant Demographic Survey

Participant Demographic Survey
1. Are you completely color blind?
Yes
No
I don't know

2. Do you use an Android or Apple mobile device to check email?
Yes: Apple
Yes: Android
No

3. What is your age?
18 - 25
26 - 35
36 - 45
46 - 55
56 - 65
66 - 75
Older than 75

4. With which gender do you identify?
Female
Male
Other
Prefer not to say
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Appendix G
Example of Participant Attention Span Test
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Appendix H
Example of Phishing Email
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Appendix I
Example of Phishing Email with Warning Dialog
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Appendix J
Example of Phishing Email with Warning Dialog with Timer
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Appendix K
Data Collection Detail
No
R
Q1

R
Q2

R
Q3

Research
Question
What are the three
timer values to
require the user to
pause that should
be used in this
experimental field
study to assess
users’ ability to
identify malicious
links in e-mail
according to
cybersecurity
SMEs?
What level of
functional
correctness and
validity of the
custom-designed
mobile app is
sufficient
according
cybersecurity
SMEs?
Are there
statistically
significant mean
differences
between the ability
to avoid clicking
on a malicious link
of e-mail users
who are not
required to pause
vs. email users
who are required
to pause at three
separate timer
values displayed
with a warning in

Collection
Instrument
SME
anonymous
survey

Specific Data Collection
Question or Screen
Question:
Please rank the timer
values from best to use to
worst to use.

Analysis
Delphi method
with Kendall’s
W values
Three timer
values with
highest
agreement
among SMEs
will be chosen
for Phases II
and III

SME
Quantitative
Feedback

PAT

Please record the actions
taken while SME tester is
using PAT.

PAT main application
screen
Data collected for open
emails with URL:
• URL
• Whether link or
attachment was
clicked

Direct
Observation
with Delphi
method
PAT will be
validated and
considered
functionally
correct
factorial
ANOVA
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R
Q4

R
Q5
a

(a) grey, (b) red, or
(c) black text?
Are there
PAT
statistically
significant mean
differences
between the ability
to avoid clicking
on a malicious link
of e-mail users
who are not
required to pause
vs. email users
who are required
to pause at three
separate timer
values displayed
with: (a)
countdown timer,
(b) count-up timer,
or (c) no timer?
Are there
PAT
statistically
significant mean
differences
between the ability
to avoid clicking
on a malicious link
of e-mail users
who are not
required to pause
vs. email users
who are required
to pause at three
separate timer
values displayed
with a warning in
(a) grey, (b) red, or
(c) black text
based on the
categories of: (a)
age, (b) gender, (c)
education level,
(d) attention span,
and (e) the volume

PAT main application
screen

factorial
ANOVA

Data collected for open
emails with URL:
• URL
• Whether link or
attachment was
clicked

PAT Demographic Survey

factorial
ANCOVA
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R
Q5
b

of email that the
user receives in a
day?
Are there
PAT
statistically
significant mean
differences
between the ability
to avoid clicking
on a malicious link
of e-mail users
who are not
required to pause
vs. email users
who are required
to pause at three
separate timer
values displayed
with: (a)
countdown timer,
(b) count-up timer,
or (c) no timer
based on the
categories of: (a)
age, (b) gender, (c)
education level,
(d) attention span,
and (e) the volume
of email that the
user receives in a
day?

PAT Demographic Survey

factorial
ANCOVA
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Appendix L
Institutional Review Board Exemption Letter

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Institutional Review Board

MEMORANDUM
To:

Amy E Antonucci, MS
College of Engineering and Computing

From:

Ling Wang, Ph.D.
College Representative, College of Engineering and Computing

Date:

November 29, 2020

Subject:

IRB Exempt Initial Approval Memo

TITLE:

Pause for a Cybersecurity Cause: Assessing the Influence of a Waiting Period on
User Habituation in Mitigation of Phishing Attacks– NSU IRB Protocol Number 2020-588

Dear Principal Investigator,
Your submission has been reviewed and Exempted by your IRB College Representative or their
Alternate on November 29, 2020. You may proceed with your study.
Please Note: Exempt studies do not require approval stamped documents. If your study site
requires stamped copies of consent forms, recruiting materials, etc., contact the IRB Office.
Level of Review: Exempt
Type of Approval: Initial Approval
Exempt Review Category: Exempt 2: Interviews, surveys, focus groups, observations of public
behavior, and other similar methodologies
Post-Approval Monitoring: The IRB Office conducts post-approval review and monitoring of all
studies involving human participants under the purview of the NSU IRB. The Post-Approval
Monitor may randomly select any active study for a Not-for-Cause Evaluation.
Annual Status of Research Update: You are required to notify the IRB Office annually if your
Page 1 of 2

3301 College Avenue • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7796
(954) 262-5369 • 866-499-0790 • Fax: (954) 262-3977 • Email: irb@nova.edu • Web site: www.nova.edu/irb
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